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INTRODUCTION 
As a society, we remain conflicted by the benefits, burdens, and economic 
obligations that should accompany the venerable institution of marriage. 
Few modern marriages are "traditional" ones1 where the husband works in 
the market to provide for the family's financial needs, the wife remains in 
the home to provide for the family's emotional needs, and the blissfully 
happy couple stays together till death do them part. 2 Perhaps as a reflection 
of the times, at least one state now offers two marriage options to potential 
mates: a risk-free, no-fault version and a burdensome "covenant" version. 3 
1 For a typical view of traditional marriages, see George F. James, The Income of Mar-
ried Couples: Is the Knutson Bill Justice? 26 TAXES 311, 366 (Apr. 1948) ("It must be 
recognized that the basic American social pattern is still that of married couples living to-
gether, the husband being the principal or sole wage earner, and the wife's major contri-
bution being the management of the home and 1he care of children."). 
2 It is doubtful whether the husband-in-marketplace, wife-at-home paradigm actually 
was a "tradition" for all groups of society. See Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Be-
yond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2282 n.282 (1994) (positing that this 
notion of "tradition" refers to Protestant views of marriage). Because African-American 
wives and mothers consistently have worked outside the home in numbers that vastly out-
number those of white women, the "traditional" marriage paradigm most likely was never 
part of their tradition. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT 201 (1981) 
("[T]he stay-at-home housewife so taken for granted in the legal model is an ideal that 
poor black families cannot afford."); Twila L. Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege, and De-
pendency in the Search for Theory, 82 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2486-90 (1994) (noting that neither 
the past nor the present structure of most black marriages fits with the paradigm assumed 
in discussions of marriage). Indeed, recent statistical studies suggest that most black 
mothers are not currently married and many do not cohabitate with the fathers of their 
children. See Jane Mauldon, Family Change and Welfare Reform, 36 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 325, 330-33 (1996). 
3 See Covenant Marriage Law, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (West 1991 & Supp. 
1998); see also Terry Carter, A Stealth Anti-Divorce Weapon, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1, 1997, at 
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Louisiana passed its covenant marriage law after some legislators expressed 
concerns that prospective spouses do not fully understand the emotional and 
economic demands that marriage entails and that some people trade in 
spouses like people trade in cars. 4 Although Louisiana and other states5 are 
in the process of reassessing the duties that prospective spouses must assume 
before they marry and before they divorce, no federal or state legislative 
body has developed a normative standard for assessing spouses' financial 
obligations to each other while they remain married. 
Over 1. 3 million individuals filed for bankruptcy relief in 1997, an in-
crease of almost 200% since 1990.6 Statistically, a significant proportion of 
those individual filers are likely to be married.7 A married person who files 
for bankruptcy receives certain benefits under the Bankruptcy Code simply 
because of his8 marital status.9 These benefits, which collectively I shall re-
28 (discussing the premarital counseling requirements and additional burdens imposed by 
covenant marriage). 
4 See Ellen Goodman, Louisiana's New Marriage Options, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Aug. 10, 1997, at 87 (discussing bill author's analogy between marriage and 
buying a new car, where making "payments" for the first twelve months "[is]n't a prob-
lem" but becomes less exciting for payors as they "get into the third, fourth and fifth year 
of making those payments"). 
5 A bill to amend the Code of Virginia to provide for covenant marriage was recently 
entered in the Virginia General Assembly. See H.B. No. 1056 (Va. 1998). 
6 See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, U.S. Bankruptcy Filings (1980-1997): Non-
business Total (visited July 16, 1998) <http://www .abiworld.org/stats/statsfront.html >; 
see also Bankruptcy Code: Witnesses at Senate Hearing Disagree on Need for Congress to 
Review Code, BNA BANKR. L. DAILY, May 20, 1991 (reporting 725,000 bankruptcy fil-
ings in 1990, a 300% increase over the 227,000 filings in 1979); Reform: Review Panel's 
Consumer Proposals "Miss Mark," Credit Union Group Asserts, BNA BANKR. L. DAILY, 
Jan. 7, 1998 (reporting on 1997 bankruptcy filings). 
7 Sixty percent of all adults in the United States are married. See 1997 U.S. BUREAU OF 
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
at 55 (117th ed.). 
8 Both husbands and wives are entitled to bankruptcy benefits based on marital status. I 
will refer to debtors as "he" or "him" because a survey of the reported decisions indicates 
that husbands, not wives, are most likely to use bankruptcy laws to protect their non-
debtor spouses. See sources cited infra note 11 (discussing cases in which a debtor has 
protected property used by a non-debtor spouse); see also Ottilie Bello, Comment, Bank-
ruptcy and Divorce: The Courts Send a Message to Congress, 13 PACE L. REV. 643, 643 
n.4 (1993). 
9 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy 
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 11 and 29 U.S.C.) (allowing, inter alia, stays of action for co-debtors); Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 11 and 28 U.S.C.) (allowing, inter alia, married couples to file joint 
bankruptcy petitions and to claim certain exemptions). 
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fer to as "marital benefits," include: ( 1) the right to file a joint petition; 10 (2) 
the ability to shield specific types of property from creditors; 11 (3) the right 
to include expenses for a non-debtor spouse in a bankruptcy budget; 12 and 
(4) the ability to protect a non-debtor spouse from certain debt collection ac-
tivities.13 The biggest benefit, however, is indirect. That is, a married cou-
ple could agree that the husband will be solely responsible for purchasing 
household goods, items for the family, or items used solely by his wife. The 
husband could then file for relief in bankruptcy to discharge any debts in-
curred in making such purchases. Because the debts would be in the hus-
band's name, his wife would have no obligation under bankruptcy laws to 
help him pay those bills, even if she possessed assets or disposable income 
that she could use to service the debt. 
Although Congress recently enacted sweeping legislation to deny unmar-
ried mothers the right to receive welfare benefits unless they work to earn 
those benefits, 14 Congress has not required non-debtor spouses to earn the 
bankruptcy benefits that they indirectly receive when their spouses' debts are 
discharged. Under the current system, the subset of married individuals 
among the 1.3 million bankruptcy filers receives governmental benefits with-
out a corresponding burden being imposed on solvent non-filing spouses. 
10 See 11 U.S.C. § 302 (1994). 
11 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(l)(B) (allowing debtors to exempt from the estate any inter-
est in property held as tenants by the entirety or joint tenants); 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) 
(allowing debtor to exempt up to $15,000 of the debtor's interest in property that a de-
pendent uses as a residence); 11 U.S.C § 524(a)(3) (acting as an injunction against com-
munity property claims after discharge). A number of cases have arisen under this last 
provision. See, e.g., In re Homan, 112 B.R. 356, 360 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989); In re 
Strickland, 153 B.R. 909, 912 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1993) ("The discharge of debts ... pro-
hibits creditors from proceeding against community property acquired after the petition 
was filed, even as against the non-debtor spouse."); In re Smith, 140 B.R. 904, 906-07 
(Bankr. D. N.M. 1992) (noting that, following a discharge of debts, creditors are prohib-
ited from proceeding against community property); see also Norwest Fin. v. Lawver, 849 
P.2d 324, 325-26 (Nev. 1993) (noting that, in community property states, only a non-
debtor spouse with substantial separate debt would have an incentive to file jointly with a 
debtor spouse). 
12 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (defining the debtor's disposable income as income re-
ceived by the debtor that is not reasonably necessary to provide for the maintenance or 
support of a dependent of the debtor). 
13 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3) (providing that, if the bankruptcy estate includes commu-
nity property and the bankruptcy discharged any community claims, the discharge is ef-
fective against community creditors of both the non-debtor and the debtor spouse); 11 
U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1301 (prohibiting creditors from collecting co-signed debts during pen-
dency of Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 cases). 
14 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation (Welfare Reform) 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
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Instead, current laws place the burden of subsidizing the debtor onto both 
creditors and society at large rather than on the debtor's solvent spouse. 
Bankruptcy laws have two primary goals-to give debtors a "fresh start" 
and to ensure that all similarly situated creditors receive maximum debt re-
payment.15 If bankruptcy laws continue to treat married couples more fa-
vorably than others, 16 it is imperative that Congress explain why marriage 
should be encouraged via the mechanism of bankruptcy laws. Moreover, 
given the two stated goals of bankruptcy, Congress must determine if en-
couraging marriage is consistent with those goals. Marriage has always been 
viewed as a relationship involving at least some level of mutual emotional 
and economic support, and it would therefore seem that Congress would re-
quire financially able non-filing spouses17 to help their filing spouses to repay 
some of their debts. Because many federal laws, most notably tax laws, in-
tentionally give married individuals favorable treatment, this aspect of the 
bankruptcy laws is not surprising. 18 Likewise, because bankruptcy laws 
generally reflect social norms and values, 19 those laws are naturally consis-
15 See generally WARREN & WESTBROOK, infra note 17, at 219. 
16 I argue, in another context, that Congress should not award other benefits based on 
marital status because doing so unfairly discriminates against unmarried couples. See A. 
Mechele Dickerson, "Family Values" and the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal to Eliminate 
Bankruptcy Benefits Awarded on the Basis of Marital Status, -- FORDHAM L. REV.--
(1998). However, since Congress has, in fact, elected to provide status based bankruptcy 
benefits, it fails in its obligations to the public unless it clearly defines the benefits and 
burdens associated with the "status" of being married. Only by providing such definition 
will Congress be able to ensure that debtors are forced to assume certain burdens in return 
for receiving certain benefits. 
17 Many non-filing spouses may lack the ability to provide financial support to their 
spouses because they are unemployed, own no separate assets, or own assets that would be 
exempt from seizure under applicable state or bankruptcy law. See generally ELIZABETH 
WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TEXT, 
CASES, AND PROBLEMS 219 (3d ed. 1996) (indicating that most consumer bankruptcy pro-
ceedings are "no-asset" Chapter 7 liquidations in which debtors have no non-exempt assets 
that can be sold to pay debts); Jean Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors to Make 
Their Own Informed Choices-A Question of Professional Responsibility, 5 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 165, 183 n.112 (1997) (citing studies which found 95-97% of Chapter 7 
filings to be no-asset proceedings). 
18 See generally David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage 
and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 472-73 
(1996) (describing the unintended behavioral effects of laws that treat a married couple as 
a single joint entity). 
19 Debtors are required to repay some claims, as a matter of public policy, even if they 
receive a bankruptcy discharge. For example, debts for alimony, child support, student 
loans, and certain drunk driving claims are not dischargeable in either Chapter 7 or Chap-
ter 13 cases. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), (8), (9); 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2). In addition, 
Congress responded to the rash of bankruptcy filings by airlines in the 1980s by amending 
section 365 of the Code to restrict airlines' ability to perform under certain airport leases. 
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tent with a pervasive societal desire to foster marriage. Although supporting 
or promoting marriage may be a justifiable public policy in theory, the prac-
tice of using the bankruptcy marital benefits to promote marriage, given the 
monumental number of individuals filing for bankruptcy relief, is question-
able. 
This Article considers the role of marital status in bankruptcy and argues 
that the law should generally deny federal bankruptcy benefits to any married 
debtor whose spouse refuses to accept a burden typically associated with 
marriage-the duty to support one's spouse both emotionally and financially. 
Part I discusses three models of marriage that family law scholars have de-
veloped to define the rights and duties associated with marriage, as well as 
the burdens that Congress logically should impose on married debtors under 
each model. This Part also traces the historical evolution of ideas about the 
economic relationship between spouses and discusses how courts and legis-
lators have responded to this evolution. This part concludes by noting that 
modern attempts to redefine the rights and duties of spouses generally arose 
from states' attempts to protect the property of wives both in the context of 
marriage and upon divorce. 20 
Part II discusses the public policy ramifications of adopting each of these 
models and argues that Congress should adopt the partnership model. This 
model presumes that spouses would help to pay each other's debts. Spouses 
could rebut the presumption by showing either that the debts sought to be 
discharged in bankruptcy did not benefit the marital partnership or that all 
partnership assets have already been made available to creditors in the filing 
spouse's bankruptcy case. I conclude by arguing that Congress should deny 
marital benefits to any married debtor whose spouse indirectly or directly 
benefits from the bankruptcy discharge unless the non-filing spouse agrees to 
support the debtor economically during the bankruptcy proceedings. 
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(d)(5)-(9), 1328(a)(2). Finally, after one CEO admitted that he filed 
a petition in bankruptcy on behalf of an airline in order to avoid the obligations imposed 
by a collective bargaining agreement, Congress amended section 1113 of the Code to make 
it more difficult for debtors to breach union agreements. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113. See gen-
erally Oversight Hearing on Effect of Bankruptcy Actions on the Stability of Labor-
Management Relations and the Preservation of Labor Standards: Joint Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the 
House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 98th Cong. 1-3 (1984). 
20 It is not surprising that modern marriage theories developed alongside divorce reform 
because divorce laws were the only ones "that spoke directly or systematically to an ideal 
of marital relations." Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of 
American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1809 (1985). 
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I. CHARACTERIZING AND DEFINING MARRIAGE 
A. Marriage as a Merger 
1. Non-Bankruptcy Law21 
The earliest marriage model in the Anglo-American legal tradition was 
that of a merger. At common law, the act of marriage was deemed to merge 
two beings into one. 22 Once the merger was complete, the law conferred a 
legally recognized status on the merged unit (the marriage entity), the terms 
of which were dictated by the state. 23 This legal status curtailed the individ-
ual wishes and interests of legally recognized24 spouses and forced them to 
21 See generally Dickerson, supra note 16 (tracing the law's treatment of marriage in 
contexts other than that of bankruptcy, as well as arguing that Congress should disregard 
marital status in awarding bankruptcy benefits). 
22 The "one" being, of course, the husband. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *442 ("By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law; that is, the 
very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is 
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection, and 
cover, she performs everything .... "). 
23 In Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888), the Supreme Court referred to mar-
riage as a "contract" but cautioned that, although the parties' consent is required to form 
the contract, once they marry, 
a relation between the parties is created which they cannot change. Other contracts 
may be modified, restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent of the 
parties. Not so with marriage. The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds 
the parties to various obligations and liabilities. It is an institution, in the mainte-
nance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of 
the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor prog-
ress. 
Id. at 211. 
24 States used marriage laws to prevent certain groups of people from entering into a 
legal marriage and thus from obtaining the benefits accorded to married couples. The 
most obvious and notable example of such laws pertained to slaves. See ORLANDO 
PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH 189-90 (1982) (discussing the relationship be-
tween the supply of slaves and the stability of slave union households). See also Stewart 
v. Munchandler, 65 Ky. 278, 281 (1867) (finding that slave marriages were illegal because 
slaves were legally incapable of contracting for any purpose); Lemons v. Harris, 80 S.E. 
740, 741 (Va. 1914) (same); cf Ray v. Ray, 134 So. 744, 744 (La. 1931) (determining 
that slaves' marriages were valid only if their masters gave consent); Erwin v. Nolan, 217 
S.W. 837, 842 (Mo. 1920) (same). Because ante-bellum state laws did not recognize mar-
riage between slaves, slave owners could destroy these marriages with impunity by keep-
ing one slave spouse and selling the other. Indeed, many slave owners used the threat of 
sale to control the behavior of their slaves. See Margaret Burnham, An Impossible Mar-
riage: Slave Law and Family Law, in FAMILY MATTERS 142, 146 (Martha Minow ed., 
1993); Twila L. Perry, Family Values, Race, Feminism and Public Policy, 36 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 345, 348 (1996). Even after slavery was abolished, states continued to 
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assume certain fixed roles as wives or husbands. 25 
At least until the middle of the twentieth century, marriage was viewed as 
a life-long legal, moral, and financial commitment that could not be termi-
nated simply because of the spouses' wishes. 26 Because the state dictated all 
terms of the marriage, parties could terminate the relationship through di-
vorce only if one party was legally at "fault," thus requiring the "innocent" 
party to prove that the "guilty" party engaged in behavior inconsistent with 
the duties of marriage. 27 By providing only narrow grounds for the termina-
tion of a marriage, a state ensured that its interest in preserving the marital 
unit28 triumphed over any private29 interests of individual spouses. 
denigrate and interfere with the right of blacks to marry. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (holding that statutes prohibiting interracial marriages are unconsti-
tutional). 
States still refuse to grant legal recognition to marriages involving people deemed by 
society to be either unworthy or incapable of fulfilling the duties associated with marriage. 
See, e.g., N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW§ 79-a (McKinney 1992) (deeming anyone sentenced to 
imprisonment for life "civilly dead," thereby rendering such a person incapable of enter-
ing into any contract, including one of marriage); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-5 (1996) 
(deeming marriages of the mentally ill and mentally challenged, to whom the state refers 
as "lunatics" and "idiots," absolutely void). 
25 See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
26 See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY 19 (1991) (discussing 
early marriage laws, which tightly regulated marriages and their dissolution); MILTON C. 
REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 10-12 (1993) (noting that any 
agreement by the spouses to alter the state imposed rights and duties of marital partners 
was unenforceable); LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 4 (1985) ("The 
Church enforced its view of marriage as a sacrament that could not be dissolved by mere 
mortals."); Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Mar-
riage, 62 VA. L. REV. 663, 703-04 (1976) (discussing the evolution of marriage from "a 
relationship that was legally terminable only for serious cause to a relationship dissoluble 
at will"). 
27 See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
§ 7.1, at 429-431 (2nd ed. 1987); JOHN DE WITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING 
FAMILY LAW§ 7.01 (1993); see also Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status 
Law: Adjudicating Wives' Right to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2182-83 
(1994). 
28 See Heather Hamilton, Comment, The Defense of Marriage Act: A Critical Analysis 
of 1ts Constitutionality Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 943, 
959 (1998). 
29 Many feminist family law scholars reject the notion that it is possible to create a wall 
that separates public and market interests from those that operate in the private and famil-
ial sphere. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL 
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 186-88 (1995) (observing that the 
notion of a family's right to "privacy" was often used as an excuse for the states' failure to 
address the public health problems of violence against women and children, even when 
those who were assaulted sought state intervention); Williams, supra note 2, at 2280-82 
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When marriage was a legally defined and sanctioned status, husbands and 
wives had fixed, clearly defined roles. The common law placed a unilateral 
obligation on husbands to support their wives financially30 and likewise re-
quired wives to provide domestic services for their families and consortium 
for their husbands.3 1 These obligations notwithstanding, states refused to set 
a minimum level of financial support that husbands were required to provide 
to their wives. Instead, courts routinely held that the appropriate level of 
support was a matter within the husband's sole discretion. 32 If, however, a 
wife purchased necessities such as food, clothing, shelter, or medical serv-
ices, then the husband was obliged under the doctrine of necessaries to pay 
the creditor who provided those basic goods and services for his family. 33 
(arguing that "the boundaries between the market and the family are porous"); cf REGAN, 
supra note 26, at 158-59 (arguing that the dichotomy between the public and private 
worlds is socially constructed). Regan asserts that "[l]aw and social practice thus operate 
to preserve a rigid dichotomy between the 'public' world of work, organized around an 
implicitly male worker, and the 'private' world of the family, tended by an implicitly fe-
male caregiver." /d. 
30 See Blanche Crozier, Marital Support, 15 B.U. L. REV. 28, 28 (1935). As early as 
1935, Crozier observed that the husband's legal duty to support his wife "is so familiar 
that we generally overlook its peculiar nature. Upon even the briefest analysis it is clear 
that this is a rule quite different from any which would be applied in other departments of 
life .... " /d. 
31 See generally REGAN, supra note 26, at 9-11 (discussing the respective marital duties 
and remedies that were available for breach of those duties). 
32 See Crozier, supra note 30, at 33. Crozier highlights the way in which these legal 
duties reinforced the wife's status as property. Under these conceptions of familial roles, 
a wife who lives with her husband has a "right" to receive support from him, but the 
right of support is not a right to any definite thing or to any definite amount even in 
proportion to the husband's means .... [T]he chances-which have nothing to do 
with legal rights-may be either that she will with difficulty get an inadequate subsis-
tence or that she will live in idleness and luxury. This is precisely the situation in 
which property finds itself; it may be overworked and underfed, or it may be petted 
and fed with cream, and that is a matter for the owner to decide. 
/d. See also MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, 
AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 115 (1989) (noting the trend of 
judicial noninterference in disputes involving the financial support relationships of spouses 
when they are still living together); WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 40-42 (citing cases dis-
cussing the nature and sufficiency of the support husbands were required to provide during 
marriage). 
33 See, e.g., Schrader v. Schrader, 400 P.2d 675, 678-79 (Colo. 1965) (ordering hus-
band to reimburse wife for $1 ,500 loan taken from her mother to care for herself and her 
child while the parties were still married); Ing v. Chung, 34 Haw. 709, 709-710 (1938) 
(discussing statute which mandated that a husband be liable for debts incurred by his wife 
for necessaries); Fortson v. lden, 214 N.E.2d 399, 400 (Ind. App. 1966) (holding husband 
liable to his wife's father for the expense of her burial); Gossett v. Patten, 23 Kan. 240, 
241 (1880) (holding husband liable for debts incurred by his wife in defending against di-
vorce action because the expense fell within the doctrine of necessaries); Credit Serv. 
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Although a creditor generally could force a husband to pay for his wife's or 
family's basic living expenses, the creditor bore the burden of proving (1) 
that the item was necessary;34 (2) that the husband had not already provided 
the item; and (3) that the wife lacked independent means of paying for it. 35 
The "benefit" that husbands in traditional marriages received in return for 
the "burden" of financially supporting their wives was the sole right to con-
trol them36 and all of the marital assets. 37 Once the parties "merged," the 
Corp. v. Dickerson, 243 So.2d 827, 830 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that wife's hospital 
treatment was necessary and husband was therefore liable); Thibeault v. Poole, 283 Mass. 
480, 483 (1933) (permitting husband to sue in his own name for expenses of caring for his 
wife following an accident); Tabor v. Tabor, 53 A.2d 525, 526 (R.I. 1947) (ordering fa-
ther to reimburse son for payments son made to cover his mother's hospital bills); see also 
Sellman v. Sellman, 185 P.2d 846, 847 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Annis v. Manthey, 
208 N.W. 453, 454 (Mich. 1926); Bergh v. Warner, 50 N.W. 77, 78 (Minn. 1891); Ga-
bel v. Blackburn Operating Corp., 442 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Tex. 1969); Hinton Dep't Co. 
v. Lilly, 141 S.E. 629, 630 (W.Va. 1928). 
34 Because the scope of what was "necessary" was dependent on the husband's financial 
status, creditors could seek reimbursement for a greater number of items from wealthier 
husbands, including legal expenses, furniture, funeral expenses, or expensive items of 
clothing. See, e.g., Anderson v. W.T. Grant Co., 226 So.2d 166, 167-168 (Ala. Ct. App. 
1969) (discussing the general rule that husbands must provide necessaries and affirming 
judgment for plaintiff company to recover debt for clothes from the husband of a credit 
holder); Dean v. Belk-Gallant Co., 145 S.E.2d 118, 119 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965) (affirming 
judgment that husband was liable for wife's purchases of clothing and bed linen made on 
husband's credit card absent an express agreement that the wife was to be liable); see also 
cases cited supra note 33; Karol Williams, Comment, The Doctrine of Necessaries: Con-
temporary Application as a Support Remedy, 19 STETSON L. REV. 661, 664 (1990) 
(reviewing the relativist view of necessaries). 
35 See Webb v. Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth., 521 So.2d 199, 204 (Fla. 1988) 
(making a spouse's inability to pay a condition precedent to the application of the doctrine 
of necessaries); Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. Buckstaff, 299 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Wise. 1980) 
(discussing the elements of the doctrine of necessaries and its evolution in Wisconsin law). 
Thus, although creditors theoretically had an incentive to give a married woman necessary 
goods and services, in practice few creditors offered credit on this basis because of their 
uncertainty about what items courts would find to be necessaries. See Note, The Unneces-
sary Doctrine of Necessaries, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1767, 1767 (1984). 
36 At common law, a husband could give his wife "moderate correction" for her 
"misbehaviour." See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *444. Any harm caused by such 
"corrections" could not be legally compensated because common law considered the wife 
and the husband to be a single legal entity, and an entity cannot sue itself. See William E. 
McCurdy, Note, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 
1041-43 (1930). Moreover, even if a wife successfully recovered anything of value from 
her husband, she was not entitled to keep any of it because her husband owned her prop-
erty. See Jack L. Herskowitz, Comment, Tort Liability Between Husband and Wife: The 
Interspousal Immunity Doctrine, 21 U. MIAMI L. REV. 423, 427 n.29 (1966). Likewise, 
even when wives were given the right to prosecute their husbands for assault, the right 
often was an empty one with no remedy. Because family disputes were "private" and 
1998] MARRIAGE IN BANKRUPTCY 971 
woman's separate existence as a legal entity was annihilated in the eyes of 
the law38 and her personaP9 and economic40 rights were controlled and repre-
sented by her husband, the legal representative of the merged unit. For ex-
ample, a husband was given ownership of all his wife's assets in fee simple 
by operation of law. 41 Thus, the wife's assets could be seized by the cou-
ple's creditors to pay either the couple's debts or the husband's separate 
debts. The property subject to seizure originally included the wife's separate 
"pre-merger" property as well as property theoretically exempt from the 
debts of separate creditors such as property owned by the spouses as tenants 
by the entirety. 42 
Although "[t]he precise genesis of tenancy by the entirety is unknown," it 
depends on the legal fiction that a man and a woman merge at marriage.43 
courts felt that each family (i.e., the husband) had the right to determine the domestic gov-
ernance in their household, courts generally would not interfere in these "private" matters 
unless the wife was severely injured. See generally FINEMAN, supra note 29, at 186-88 
(observing that the right to "privacy" in family governance effectively gave men the free-
dom to assault their wives and children physically); Schneider, supra note 20, at 1835-38 
(discussing nineteenth century judicial views concerning noninterference in family affairs). 
37 See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *433 (explaining that marriage is the "sixth 
method of acquiring property in goods and chattels"). 
38 See WEITZMAN, supra note 26, at 3 ("Upon marriage the wife became a femme covert 
[sic], a legal nonperson, living under her husband's arm, protection, and cover.") (citation 
omitted). 
39 At common law, wives could not participate in any legal actions, such as executing a 
contract, suing, or being sued, in their own names. See Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 
1399 (5th Cir. 1974) (recognizing that the domicile of the wife is ordinarily deemed to be 
that of her husband); Glendon, supra note 26, at 702 (explaining that the custom of women 
changing their names upon marriage had been so strong that most people believed it 
changed as a matter of law); see also WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 9-12 (discussing a 
wife's loss of independent identity through the compelled loss of her name). 
40 See Crozier, supra note 30, at 29 ("The financial plan of marriage law was founded 
upon the economic relationship of owner and property."). 
41 See John D. Johnston, Jr., Sex and Property: 1he Common Law Tradition, the Law 
School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033, 1045 
(1972) (discussing the instantaneous loss of title in her assets that a woman experienced 
upon marriage). Before the nineteenth century, the doctrine of coverture deprived wives 
of the right to control their property and gave that right to their husbands. See Joan C. 
Williams, Married Women and Property, 1 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L. 383, 385 (1994) 
("Married women 'covered' by their husbands lost control over property brought into the 
marriage .... "). 
42 See generally Caryl A. Yzenbaard, Ohio's Beleaguered Entirety Statute, 49 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 99, 102-03 (1980) (describing the four approaches used to determine to what de-
gree tenancy property was subject to levy and execution by creditors of one spouse at that 
time). 
43 See 7 RICHARD R. POWELL ET AL., POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ~ 620[3] (Patrick J. 
Rohan ed., 1998). Historically, entirety laws required that (l) each spouse have a right of 
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Entirety laws were designed to prevent creditors of one spouse from seizing 
and selling family assets to satisfy that spouse's separate debts. 44 Despite the 
harm to individual creditors, states enacted entirety laws to shield basic fam-
ily assets, particularly family homes, from creditors and thereby decrease the 
likelihood that a financially irresponsible husband would squander away the 
family's assets, thus forcing the family into poverty.45 
Just as a man's sex defined his gendered role within the merger of mar-
riage, a woman's sex also determined her gendered role as a wife. 
Throughout much of this century, with the exception of wartime, 46 wives 
were expected to remain in the home47 and serve as companions, housewives 
and mothers. 48 As a result of their forced roles as domestic caregivers, 
survivorship in entirety property; (2) the spouses acquire the same interest in property by 
the same instrument at the same time; and (3) the spouses have an undivided interest in the 
entire property. Modern entirety laws maintain the right of survivorship, prevent entirety 
property from being partitioned, and prevent spouses from disposing of entirety property 
or using it to pay individual debts without the consent of the other spouse. See Benjamin 
C. Ackerly, Tenants by the Entirety, Property and the Bankruptcy Reform Act, WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 701, 702-03 (1980). 
44 See Yzenbaard, supra note 42, at 103 (noting that the court in Sawada v. Endo, 561 
P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977), "chose the view [of entirety laws] that best protects the family"). 
45 This policy consideration makes entirety laws analogous to homestead laws. See, 
e.g., In re Johnson, 207 B.R. 878, 881 n.6 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997) (noting that Minne-
sota homestead exemption laws were designed to prevent the "destitution and dependency 
of families, and of promoting their stability, self-sustenance, and independence over the 
generations"); George L. Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1289, 1289 
(1950) (describing homestead legislation as uniquely American and tracing its origin to an 
1839 statute enacted in the Republic of Texas). 
46 Women worked in the market in greater numbers during war periods. See Kathryn 
Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. 
L. REv. 1183, 1248 (1989) (describing the accommodations that employers made during 
wartime to encourage women to stay in the workforce, including the provision of child 
care, shopping facilities, meals, and convenient banking); Phyllis T. Bookspan, A Delicate 
Imbalance-Family and Work, 5 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 37, 45 n.45 (1995) (observing that, 
after Pearl Harbor, women's participation in the workforce rose 460%); Marion Crain, 
Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 1155, 1166-69 (1991) (describing the need for female workers during World War II 
as effecting a temporary change in the position of women in the labor market). 
47 In pre-industrial agrarian marriages, wives worked both in the home and on the fam-
ily farm under the supervision of their husbands. See generally GLENDON, supra note 32, 
at Ill (describing the evolution of the role of wives from "important collaborators in in-
terdependent family enterprises" to dependents); WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 169 
(explaining that "[w]omen have always worked," but that the work women did in the past 
was typically agricultural and supervised by male family members); Glendon, supra note 
26, at 707-08 (noting that a woman's role included caring for the household and children, 
as well as participation in the agricultural production unit). 
48 See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 60-64; cf REGAN, supra note 26, at 27-32 
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wives were perceived to be intellectually inferior and essentially incompetent 
in all financial matters outside the home. 49 For example, a wife could not 
own separate property, enter into contracts, execute legal documents, or 
maintain a domicile separate from her husband. 50 Indeed, even if a wife was 
forced to work in order to help support her family, her husband was legally 
entitled to her wages. 51 
The Married Women's Property Acts, adopted in various states throughout 
the middle and late nineteenth century, ultimately52 gave adult 53 married 
women the right to retain ownership of pre-marital property as well as per-
sonal wage earnings.54 Because these acts shielded property that parents had 
(discussing the Victorian role expectations of spouses). Again, this most likely was not 
expected of black wives, who historically have held wage earning jobs. See discussion 
supra note 2. 
49 See Cheryl I. Harris, Myths of Race and Gender in the Trials of 0.1. Simpson and 
Susan Smith-Spectacles of Our Times, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 225, 234 (1996) (discussing 
the role that the myth of women's inferiority has played in the subordination of women); 
Lucille M. Ponte, United States v. Virginia: Reinforcing Archaic Stereotypes About 
Women in the Military Under the Flawed Guise of Educational Diversity, 7 HASTINGS 
WOMEN's L.J. 1, 32-33 (1996). Although wives were expected to stay home to care for 
their children, states gave fathers the sole right to control their children. See FINEMAN, 
supra note 29, at 76. As a result, until the early part of the twentieth century, mothers 
routinely were denied custody of their children when they divorced their husbands. See 
LINDA D. ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRAC. & PROC. § 1:05 (1993). 
50 See Rev a B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning 
Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082 (1994) (describing the 
status and rights of married women in the ante-bellum period); Williams, supra note 41, at 
386-87 (same); see also supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text. 
51 Although many states adopted "earnings statutes" in the 1860s that were designed to 
give wives the right to their wages, wives in Georgia were not entitled to own their wages 
until 1943. See City of Commerce v. Bradford, 94 S.E.2d 160, 169 (Ga. Ct. App. 1956); 
see also Siegel, supra note 50, at 1080-92 (providing a brief overview of married women's 
rights before and after the Civil War); Siegel, supra note 27, at 2145 (discussing the 
movement towards earnings statutes). 
52 See Williams, supra note 41, at 387-89 (noting that the earlier Married Women's 
Property Acts did not grant wives title to their earnings and explaining that, prior to the 
earnings statutes, a husband was entitled to both his wife's services and her wages); see 
also Crozier, supra note 30, at 35-41 (noting that early judicial interpretations of these acts 
deemed a wife's wages to be owned by her husband). 
53 See, e.g., VA. CoDE ANN. § 55-44 (Michie 1995 & 1997 Supp.) (mandating that a 
receiver be placed in control of a wife's estate during her coverture and while she was a 
minor). 
54 See POWELL, supra note 43, at , 622[2] (discussing the effect of women's property 
laws on entirety laws); Johnston, supra note 41, at 1061 (discussing the "flurry of legisla-
tion" to implement Married Women's Property Acts between 1839 and 1895). See, e.g., 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 311 (1993 & 1996 Supp.); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/9 
(West 1993 & 1998 Supp.); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-9-2 (West 1979 & 1998 Supp.); 
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bequeathed to their daughters from the separate creditors of their daughters' 
husbands, these laws provided wives with some degree of protection from 
their husbands' improvident behavior.55 Overall, however, wives in tradi-
tional merger marriages were viewed both legally and socially as helpless 
and intellectually inferior to men in all matters outside the home56 and were 
kept both economically and physically57 subordinate and subservient to their 
husbands. 58 
2. Marriage as a Merger in Bankruptcy 
As a matter of bankruptcy policy, Congress could view marriage as a tra-
ditional merger and grant benefits accordingly. If Congress chooses to adopt 
this model, it should impose financial obligations on both the debtor and non-
debtor spouse in a manner consistent with the view that the spouses are truly 
"one." Thus, if the law were to treat spouses as merged upon marriage, 
then one spouse would not be allowed to file a bankruptcy petition unless the 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 557.21 (West 1988 & 1998 Supp.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
460:1, :2 (1992 & 1997 Supp.); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW§ 50 (McKinney 1988 & 1998 
Supp.); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 52-1, -2 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 3103.07 (Anderson 
1996 & 1997 Supp.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-5-10, -20, -30, -40 (Law Co-op, 1985 & 
Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-504 (1996 & 1997 Supp.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-
2-1, -2, -3, -4 (1995 & 1997 Supp.). See generally Richard H. Chused, Married Women's 
Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1359-61 (1983). 
55 The original impetus behind allowing women to own property distinct from that of 
their husbands was to protect wealth transfers by the rich. Giving wives the right to own 
property in their own names ensured that wealthy parents could bequeath property to their 
daughters without having the property automatically transferred to their sons-in-law. See 
Siegel, supra note 27, at 2135-36. 
56 See e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) 
(arguing that women are "unfit" for many occupations in the market, including law, be-
cause the "domestic sphere" is the "domain and function[] of womanhood"). 
57 Wives, viewed as little more than their husbands'· chattels, had no legal rights to 
bodily integrity. Because the Jaw assumed that sex-on-demand was an irrevocable term of 
the marriage contract, a husband could not commit acts that would fall within the legal 
definition of the "rape" of his wife. See 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF 
THE CROWN *629; Lisa R. Eskow, Note, The Ultimate Weapon? Demythologizing Spousal 
Rape and Reconceptualizing Its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REV. 677, 680 (1996) (quoting 
HALE, supra, and discussing the historical rationale for the marital rape exemption); Jaye 
Sitton, Comment, Old Wine in New Bottles: The "Marital" Rape Allowance, 72 N.C. L. 
REV. 261,264-68 (1993) (discussing the legal history of the marital rape exemption). For 
a general discussion of marital rape statutory exemptions, including attempts to extend the 
exemption to non-married cohabiting males, see Eskow, supra, at 681-83. 
58 Not surprisingly, the traditional plighting of troth in marriage ceremonies required 
women to pledge to "Jove, honor and obey" their husbands, while men were required to 
"love, honor and keep" their wives. See, e.g., To Love, Honor-and Obey? TIME, July 
21, 1986, at 45 (comparing the marriage vows of Princess Diana to the more traditional 
vows of the Duchess of York). 
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other spouse also files a petition. Moreover, because separate assets would 
be treated as joint assets in such a merger marriage, creditors of the debtor 
spouse would have the right to use the property of both spouses to satisfy the 
debts sought to be discharged, including property held separately or as ten-
ants by the entirety. In cases where the non-filing spouse can prove that she 
has no income and no separate assets, the debtor spouse would be allowed to 
shield from creditors property that is used by the "dependent" spouse. 
a. Joint Filing 
The predecessor to the current Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Act, 
contained no provisions for joint filings because married women historically 
could not incur debt or own property separate from their husbands. 59 With-
out personal debt or property, there was no need for married women ever to 
file for bankruptcy protection in order to discharge debts or protect property. 
In contrast, section 302 of the Code gives married couples the right to file a 
joint bankruptcy petition. 60 The scant legislative history behind section 302 
suggests that Congress believed that most married couples hold most of their 
property jointly and should therefore be jointly liable on their debts. 61 Based 
on its assumption that most married couples have merged their finances and 
property, Congress allowed bankruptcy proceedings for married debtors to 
be administered jointly, primarily in order to save the debtors the expense of 
having to hire more than one attorney and pay two sets of filing fees, 62 as 
59 See generally In re Knobel, 167 B.R. 436, 439 (Bankr. W .D. Tex. 1994) (describing 
how section 302 of the Code changed previous bankruptcy law). 
60 See 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994). 
61 SeeS. REP. No. 95-989, at 32 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5818. 
In the course of testimony about the proposed code, one prominent bankruptcy judge testi-
fied that: 
A significant reality about contemporary consumer credit and therefore of consumer 
insolvency is that these debtors are usually married persons, often jointly obligated, 
but frequently entirely dependent upon the husband's earnings alone. Just as fre-
quently, however, these families have little discretionary income to commit to non-
essentials and the wife actually disposes of most of the family income for basic family 
necessaries. 
Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil 
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1317 (1976) 
(statement of Ron. Conrad K. Cyr, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, District of Maine). 
62 Legal fees and costs can be daunting, especially given that clients in bankruptcy are 
unlikely to have any significant liquid resources. Debtors currently must pay $130 to file 
a case and $45 in administrative fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(1) (1994). One study has 
shown that the average attorney's fee for a Chapter 13 case is $535 and for a Chapter 7 
case is $459. See Braucher, supra note 17, at 175 n.55. Another study found the average 
Chapter 13 fee to be $820 and the average Chapter 7 fee to be $637. See id.; cf In re 
Raffle, 216 B.R. 290, 296 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998) (fees in "vanilla" Chapter 13 cases 
should generally not exceed $1 ,200.); In re Crivilare, 213 B.R. 721, 723 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 
1997) (average fee in Southern District of Illinois is $500); In re Lee, 209 B.R. 708, 712 
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well as to reduce the administrative costs involved in having two separate 
bankruptcy cases. 63 
If Congress were to treat marriage as a merger, a joint filing should be 
mandatory rather than optional. If two spouses are legally deemed to be one 
entity, they could possess only joint assets and incur only joint debts. As a 
merged unit, both parties would be responsible for paying those debts64 and, 
consequently, both would have to receive a discharge in order to eliminate 
their personal liability for those debts. Thus, the only circumstance in which 
only one spouse would be allowed to file but the other would be granted re-
lief in bankruptcy would be when the spouses could prove that the wife has 
no separate property or income and that the husband's case involves the ad-
ministration of both joint assets and his separate assets. 
b. Substantive Consolidation of Spousal Assets 
Filing jointly permits spouses' cases to move through bankruptcy with the 
same attorney and trustee. Joint administration does not, however, permit 
the creditors of one spouse to seek recovery of their claims from the other 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997) (recovery of attorney fees over $800 because of special circum-
stances); In re Taylor, 100 B.R. 42, 46 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989) (award of $970 in fees for 
routine Chapter 13 case). 
In addition to reducing out-of-pocket expenses, filing jointly probably reduces the 
amount of time each debtor must devote to attending bankruptcy hearings. By local rule, 
courts can excuse one spouse from having to participate fully in a bankruptcy case if the 
attending spouse can provide all.relevant financial information for the absentee spouse. 
See In re Keiser, 204 B.R. 697, 699 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996) ("It is the well established 
practice in this District in cases involving joint debtors to excuse one co-debtor from at-
tending the section 341 meeting upon good cause shown so long as the other co-debtor at-
tends and answers all questions to all parties' satisfaction."). The court in Keiser ulti-
mately dismissed the bankruptcy case of the non-attending spouse. See id. at 699. The 
court noted, however, that the spouse's presence was not vital but that it viewed both the 
dismissal and the entire controversy as primarily a "struggle of wills" between the United 
States trustee and the couple's attorney. See id. 
63 See In re Allen, 186 B.R. 769, 771 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995) ("Joint administration is 
thus a procedural tool permitting use of a single docket for administrative matters .... ") 
(citation omitted); D'Avignon v. Palmisano, 34 B.R. 796, 799 (D. Vt. 1982); In re Coles, 
14 B.R. 5, 6 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981). 
64 This approach is consistent with the obligation a merged corporation owes to the 
companies that participated in the merger. That is, under general corporate law, a new 
corporation formed as a result of the merger of two or more entities is responsible for all 
the debts and liabilities of the previously independent entities unless the merger agreement 
or applicable law provides otherwise. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE§ 1107 (West 1990 & 
1998 Supp.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (1991 & 1998 Supp.); John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964) (holding a successor corporation bound to 
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement executed by its predecessor); Krull v. Ce-
lotex Corp., 611 F. Supp. 146, 148 (N.D. III. 1985); In re Iota Industries, Inc., 33 B.R. 
49, 50 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
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spouse's property. 65 Creditors would have access to the other spouse's as-
sets only if the court substantively consolidated the debtors' cases and treated 
the two cases as if they were one. 66 Although Congress acted on the as-
sumption that most married couples have joint debts and assets, it recognized 
that some do not. Accordingly, it gave courts the discretion to decide 
whether the spouses' assets and liabilities should be combined into a single 
pool. 67 Courts typically consolidate spouses' cases only if the spouses' assets 
and debts are substantially intertwined68 and if the benefits of consolidation 
outweigh any harm it might create. 69 
If one spouse is allowed to file a separate bankruptcy petition, but the 
bankruptcy court is prevented from ordering that the non-filing spouse's as-
sets be used (or sold) to pay debts that may have benefited the marital unit, 
married debtors will have a strategic incentive to shift debts to one spouse 
and title assets in the name of the other spouse before filing a petition. In 
this way, spouses could shield assets from creditors in the debtor-spouse's 
bankruptcy case. Because bankruptcy laws are intended to give a fresh start 
only to debtors, and not to any entity associated with debtors, 70 providing a 
65 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b). 
66 See In re Reider, 31 F.3d 1102, 1109 (11th Cir. 1994) (discussing differences be-
tween joint administration and substantive consolidation). 
67 See id. Section eleven of the Code provides that courts have the discretion to 
"determine the extent, if any, to which the debtors' estates shall be consolidated." 11 
U.S.C. § 302(b); see also J. Stephen Gilbert, Note, Substantive Consolidation in Bank-
ruptcy: A Primer, 43 VAND. L. REV. 207, 231 (1990) (discussing two-step approach used 
by courts to decide whether cases will be consolidated). 
68 See In re Knobel, 167 B.R. 436, 441 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994) (discussing whether 
the spouses' residency in a community property state constitutes sufficient intermingling to 
qualify for consolidation); In the Matter of Chan, 113 B.R. 427, 428 (N.D. Ill. 1990) 
("Cases should be consolidated where the affairs of the husband and wife are so intermin-
gled that their respective assets and liabilities cannot be separated."); In the Matter of 
Steury, 94 B.R. 553, 555 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988) (involving consolidation with respect to 
property held by the entirety); In re Birch, 72 B.R. 103, 106 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1987) ("It 
has been held that husband and wife consolidations are justified only when the inter-
relationship of the debtors' debts and assets are so 'hopelessly obscured' that they cannot 
be unscrambled.") (citation omitted); In re Scholz, 57 B.R. 259, 262 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1986) (denying a motion to consolidate because the debtors shared neither assets nor obli-
gations); In the Matter of Winston, 24 B.R. 474, 476 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); In re Bar-
nes, 14 B.R. 788, 790 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981) ("[T]he peculiarities of the Texas com-
munity property system will often justify the substantial consolidation of joint cases."). 
69 See In re Reider, 31 F.3d at 1106 (noting that injustice and harm to creditors is an 
important factor in deciding whether or not to consolidate); Steury, 94 B.R. at 554. 
70 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) ("(D]ischarge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the li-
ability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt."). A non-
debtor spouse would, however, be relieved of paying claims against community property 
for which he or she would otherwise be liable if those claims were discharged in the 
debtor's bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3). 
978 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:961 
financial incentive to engage in this strategic pre-filing behavior not only 
goes far beyond the fresh start policy, but also thwarts bankruptcy's goal of 
maximizing repayment of creditors. 
If marriage is viewed as a merger, creditors of both spouses should have 
access to all marital assets, regardless of whether the assets are nominally 
titled in the name of one spouse or whether only one spouse. files a bank-
ruptcy petition. Although using a non-filing spouse's assets to pay the filing 
spouse's debts may be controversial, 71 a per se rule of asset consolidation for 
married couples would be consistent with the approach to consolidation taken 
by courts in cases involving estates of closely related debtor and non-debtor 
businesses and debtors and related non-debtor individuals. 
In cases involving business entities, courts have been reluctant to consoli-
date the assets of debtors and non-debtors. 72 Courts have indicated that con-
solidation should be ordered only on rare occasions, in part because substan-
tive consolidation is not explicitly authorized by the Code. 73 Other courts 
have concluded that bankruptcy courts cannot consolidate a non-debtor's as-
sets because they lack jurisdiction over the non-debtor. 74 Still others have 
suggested that granting such a consolidation request would amount to an in-
voluntary bankruptcy filing against the non-debtor without allowing that 
party any of the protections that debtors receive under the Code. 75 
71 See Christopher J. Predko, Note, Substalltive Consolidation Involving Non-Debtors: 
Conceptual and Jurisdictional Difficulties in Bankruptcy, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1741, 1764-
66 (1995) (arguing that bankruptcy courts do not have jurisdiction over the administration 
of solvent non-debtors). 
72 See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Colonial Realty Co., 966 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 
1992) (discussing consolidation cases and indicating that consolidation is an extreme rem-
edy which must be used sparingly); In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd., 860 F.2d 515, 
518 (2d Cir. 1988) (cautioning that the power to consolidate should be used sparingly be-
cause of the potential for injustice). 
73 See Eastgroup Properties v. Southern Motel Assoc., Ltd., 935 F.2d 245, 248 (11th 
Cir. 1991); In re Auto-train Corp., 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Courts generally 
rely on section 105 of the Code to justify bringing a non-debtor's assets within a debtor's 
bankruptcy estate. See e.g., In re Munford, Inc., 115 B.R. 390, 397 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
1990). Section l05(a) of the Code gives courts the authority to "issue any order, process, 
or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of' the Code. 11 
U.S.C. § 105(a). 
74 See In re DRW Property Co., 54 B.R. 489, 497 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985) ("The 
court is also unaware of any statutory or common law authority to consolidate substan-
tively debtor and non-debtor partnership. The non-debtor partnerships are certainly well-
outside of the scope of this Court's jurisdiction."); In re Alpha & Omega Realty, Inc., 36 
B.R. 416, 417 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1984). 
75 See In re Lease-A-Fleet, 141 B.R. 869, 874 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992) ("It seems to 
this court that it is cruel and unusual, among other things, for an entity to be in some way 
appended as a party to a debtor's case, but to not have the benefit of the automatic stay, 
avoidance powers, or the right to formulate a plan of reorganization, as does any 
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Notwithstanding these reservations, most courts conclude that consolida-
tion is proper when the debtor and non-debtor are alter-egos or have engaged 
in acts that would warrant piercing the corporate veil. 76 Thus, where the 
debtor and non-debtor have disregarded corporate formalities, have commin-
gled assets, or where there is "substantial identity" between the parties such 
that one entity exercises "ultimate control over the assets" and the other en-
tity operates as a mere instrumentality, courts are likely to consolidate the 
assets of the debtor and non-debtor. 77 Even where these factors are present, 
however, courts may deny a request to consolidate if creditors show that un-
scrambling the debtor's and non-debtor's assets would cause the creditors 
harm or be unjust. 78 
If marriage is viewed as a merger, spouses' bankruptcy cases should be 
consolidated by operation of law. If marriage truly merges two lives, all of 
the debt would be joint; all property would be jointly owned; and neither 
spouse would have separate creditors. If all assets and debts are joint, which 
must necessarily be the case for a merged unit, there would be substantial 
identity between the debtor and non-debtor. Likewise, in marriages that are 
viewed as analogous to the merger of two corporations, one of which is the 
alter ego of the other, only one spouse would control the assets and the non-
debtor spouse would be a mere instrumentality of the other. 
Although courts have allowed creditors to prevent consolidation if the 
creditors can demonstrate that they relied on the separate credit and assets of 
one of the spouses and would thus be harmed by a consolidation, 79 if mar-
debtor."); see also Predko, supra note 71, at 1766 (comparing substantive consolidation to 
an involuntary bankruptcy without the requisite safeguards). 
76 See Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 218 (1941) (indicating 
that when a family corporation is "so closely assimilated to the affairs of the dominant 
stockholder that in substance it is little more than his corporate pocket," a bankrupt's 
creditors can reach the corporate assets); Soviero v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 328 F .2d 446, 
448 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that there was "a unity of interest and ownership" between a 
series of corporations such that an injustice would be done to the bankrupt owner's credi-
tors not to include the corporations in the estate); In reUnited Stairs Corp., 176 B.R. 359, 
364 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995); In re Jeter, 171 B.R. 1015, 1020 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); In 
reNew Center Hosp., 179 B.R. 848, 853 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994), rev'd in part, 187 
B.R. 560 (E.D. Mich. 1995); In re Munford, Inc., 115 B.R. 390, 397 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
1990); In re Tureaud, 59 B.R. 973, 976-77 (N.D. Okla. 1986) (applying a ten-factor 
piercing test to a consolidation case); In re Crabtree, 39 B.R. 718, 720 (Bankr. E.D. 
Tenn. 1984); In re 1438 Meridian Place, 15 B.R. 89, 95 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1981). If a 
court has the jurisdiction to enjoin creditors from suing related non-debtors under section 
105, see infra notes 255-260, it is unclear why it would not also have the jurisdiction to 
consolidate some of the non-debtor's assets with the debtor's estate in cases where the 
court determines that the debtor and non-debtor are alter egos. 
77 See e.g., In re Reider, 31 F.3d 1102, 1106 (11th Cir. 1994). 
78 See id. (discussing the harm or injustice factor in substantive consolidation). 
79 See id. at 1109 (indicating that a creditor may avoid consolidation through a showing 
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riages were viewed as mergers, such a showing would not be allowed under 
the merger marriage regime because, by definition, all debts and assets are 
either joint or are held in the husband's name. Likewise, even if separate, 
pre-merger creditors exist, those creditors should be allowed to satisfy their 
claims out of the joint assets because individual members of a merged unit 
cannot, by definition, own separate property and because the post-merger 
unit is liable for all of the pre-merger debts of the two previously separate 
units. 80 
c. Exemption of Entirety Property 
If Congress adopts the model of marriage as a merger, requmng both 
spouses to file bankruptcy petitions and directing courts to consolidate the 
assets of married couples in bankruptcy, then federal law may conflict with 
state laws that protect entirety property. 81 This conflict would arise if bank-
of reliance). 
80 This would be consistent with the obligations imposed on merged corporations be-
cause, once a merger is complete, assets of the new corporation are available to creditors 
who have done business with any "division" of the new corporation. See Hoche Prods., 
S.A. v. Jayark Films Corp., 256 F. Supp. 291, 295-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (holding a film 
distribution company liable for debts of company it acquired, including liability for 
fraudulent activities); Johnson v. Marshall & Huschart Mach. Co., 384 N.E.2d 141, 143 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (indicating that consolidation or merger is one of the situations in 
which a company is liable for its predecessor's debts); see also Pullman's Palace Car Co. 
v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 115 U.S. 587, 595 (1885) (holding a railroad company bound 
to honor the contracts entered by its predecessor); Altman v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 
580 F.2d 659, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("Upon a merger or consolidation the general rule of 
law is that the successor corporation becomes obligated to pay the debts and liabilities of 
the constituent companies."); Forest Labs., Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 625 (7th 
Cir. 1971) (holding a purchasing company bound by the trade secret agreements of the 
purchased company). 
81 Forty states have had entirety laws at one time or another, and estimates of the num-
ber of jurisdictions in which the tenancy is still recognized range from as few as seventeen 
to as many as thirty-seven. See 7 POWELL, supra note 43, at 1 620[4]; see, e.g., ALASKA 
STAT. § 34.15.110(b) (Michie 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-317 (Michie 1998) 
(providing for the division of entirety property at divorce); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 25, § 309 
(1989 & 1996 Supp.); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-216 (1996 & 1998 Supp.); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 689.11, § 689.15 (West 1994 & 1998 Supp.); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 509-2 (Michie 
1993 & 1997 Supp.); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1005/lc (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 32-4-2-1 (West 1979 & 1997 Supp.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 381.050 (Michie 1972 & 
1996 Supp.); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 4-108 (1996 & 1997 Supp.); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 8 (West 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 557-71, -81, -101 
(West 1988 & 1998 Supp.); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 6-2.2(b) (McKinney 
1992 & 1998 Supp.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.3(b), -13.6 (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
60, § 74 (West 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 108.090 (1997); 23 PA. CONS. STATS. ANN. § 
3507 (West 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-3 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-109 
(1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 67 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-37 (Michie 1997); 
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ruptcy laws treated all property-whether held jointly, separately or by the 
entirety-as joint property reachable by creditors. 82 Under most state en-
tirety laws, only a creditor with a claim against both spouses can reach en-
tireties property to satisfy the claim. 83 Because the Code incorporates by 
reference the favored treatment state laws accord entirety property, 84 most 
married debtors in bankruptcy currently are able to shield entirety property 
from creditors. 
Laws permitting property owners to exempt certain property, such as en- · 
tirety property, were initially enacted for some of the same reasons as bank-
ruptcy laws-to preserve small properties with sentimental value and to pre-
vent families from sinking into poverty. 85 Yet the fact that spouses may be 
able to use a state's entirety laws to shift debts and assets, putting them be-
yond the reach of creditors, implies that the tenancy is not always consistent 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-140 (Michie 1997). 
82 11 U.S.C. § 302(b) provides that, "[a]fter commencement of a joint case, the court 
shall determine the extent, if any, to which the debtors' estates shall be consolidated," and 
section 522(b)(2)(B) provides that joint debtors must agree whether to rely on state or fed-
eral exemption laws. If the spouses file a joint petition for relief under Chapter 7, the 
trustee could liquidate the entirety property and use the equity derived from that liquida-
tion to pay the claims of joint creditors. See In re Sung, 777 F.2d 921, 932 (4th Cir. 
1985) (disallowing an exemption under section 522(b)(2)(B) of property owned by the en-
tireties and allowing the property to be administered "for the benefit of joint creditors un-
der § 363(h) "). 
83 See, e.g., In re Oberlies, 94 B.R. 916, 917 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988) (noting that, 
under Michigan law, a trustee can administer assets held by debtor and non-debtor spouse 
as tenants by the entireties for the benefit of joint creditors). See generally, Ackerly, su-
pra note 43, at 702-03. The entirety tenancy has other deleterious effects: In addition to 
preventing commercial creditors from collecting debts, it is estimated that in 1995 over 
250,000 parents who were obliged to pay child support effectively shielded assets from 
child support recipients by creating entireties estates. See Robert D. Null, Note, Tenancy 
by the Entirety as an Asset Shield: An Unjustified Safe Haven for Delinquent Child Support 
Obligors, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1057, 1092 (1995). 
84 Congress allows debtors to choose between federal bankruptcy or state exemption 
laws, see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), and, in turn, Congress gives states the right to decide 
whether to grant their citizens the right to choose between state and federal exemptions. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(l). Thus, debtors who choose to rely on state law exemptions or 
who live in states that have "opted out" of the federal bankruptcy exemptions may use 
state laws to exempt entirety property from their bankruptcy estates, thus preventing the 
trustee from using that property to satisfy creditor claims. 
85 See In re Ellingson, 63 B.R. 271, 272 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (noting that exemp-
tions further the social policies of (a) assuring that the debtor retains enough property to 
survive; (b) protecting the debtor's dignity and cultural and religious identity; (c) giving 
the debtor a chance to rehabilitate and earn future income; (d) protecting the debtor's fam-
ily from impoverishment; and (e) shifting the burden of supporting financially needy debt-
ors from society to creditors). 
982 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:961 
with the policy objectives that underpin the bankruptcy laws. 86 Moreover, 
because entirety laws are premised on the legal fiction that spouses merge at 
marriage, the Code, to be internally consistent, should not treat entirety 
property as owned by the merged unit unless it treats spousal assets as 
merged with respect to other types of property. 
Unless state law allows individual creditors to reach entireties property, 87 
a spouse who has incurred debts that benefit either the marital unit or the 
non-filing spouse can file for bankruptcy and exempt entirety property. 88 
Moreover, even if a debtor spouse cannot exempt entirety property, the Code 
severely curtails a trustee's ability to sell non-exempt entirety property. 89 
Although a trustee ordinarily has the power to sell property of the debtor's 
86 Neither state nor federal bankruptcy laws prevent debtors from using the tenancy to 
shield extravagant real or personal property from creditors. See, e.g., In re Garner, 952 
F.2d 232 (8th Cir. 1991) (involving 6700 shares of stock held by the entirety); Ramsey v. 
Ramsey, 531 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Ark. 1975) (promissory notes); Weathersbee v. Wallace, 
686 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985) (certificates of deposit); Colclazier v. Colcla-
zier, 89 So.2d 261, 264 (Fla. 1956) (corporate stock); Haid v. Haid, 175 A. 338, 340 
(Md. 1934) (motor boat); Cohen v. Goldberg, 244 A.2d 763, 765 (Pa. 1968) (bank ac-
count); In re Holmes' Estate, 200 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa. 1964) (stocks); In re McEwen's 
Estate, 33 A.2d 14, 15 (Pa. 1943) (beneficial interest in a trust). 
87 Seventeen jurisdictions permit only joint creditors to reach entirety property. See 
John V. Orth, Tenancies by the Entirety, in 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 33.06(e) 
n.81 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994 & Supp. 1997). 
88 Although section 363(h) nominally permits separate creditors to reach entirety prop-
erty, section 522(b)(2)(B) permits state law to protect some of the debtor's property by 
exempting it from process. See In re Persky, 893 F.2d 15, 18 (2nd Cir. 1989); Matter of 
Feola, 22 B.R. 81, 85 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982). States are not yet uniform in their treat-
ment of entirety property when a non-filing spouse is present. See, e.g., In re Dawson, 10 
B.R. 680, 684 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981) (holding that, under Tennessee law, a court can 
sell a debtor's right of survivorship, but because the right typically is worth little, sale 
would not be allowed because of the harm to non-debtor spouse); In re Shaw, 5 B.R. 
107,110 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980) ("Although staggered filings of bankruptcy that are 
calculated to frustrate the interests of creditors of both spouses is troublesome, it is merely 
one aspect of the larger problem presented by the continued recognition by Tennessee and 
other states of an estate in property which has long been criticized as an unjustifiable legal 
anachronism."). In most states, a trustee cannot sell either the debtor's or non-debtor 
spouse's interest in entirety property unless a creditor exists who has a joint claim against 
both spouses. See, e.g., In re Monzon, 214 B.R. 38, 41 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1997). But see 
In re Lashley, 206 B.R. 950, 953 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1997) (holding that debtor has right 
to avoid creditor's lien on entirety property even though creditor has a joint judgment 
against both debtor and non-debtor spouse); In re Himmelstein, 203 B.R. 1009, 1014 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (holding that even joint creditor cannot force sale of entirety 
property unless claim is reduced to judgment). 
89 See, e.g., In re Siegel, 204 B.R. 6, 9 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that a trus-
tee's ability to sell entireties property raises a "myriad of [sic] difficult issues" and that 
this ability may be "subject to both statutory and constitutional limitations"). 
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bankruptcy estate free and clear of any entity's interest as long as that entity 
consents,90 the trustee's power to sell either the estate's interest or the non-
debtor spouse's interest in entirety property is limited.91 That is, the trustee 
cannot sell entirety property unless the trustee establishes that ( 1) the prop-
erty cannot easily be partitioned; (2) the sale of the estate's interest would 
yield significantly less for the debtor's estate than selling the property free of 
the non-debtor spouse's interest; and (3) the benefit of selling the property 
outweighs the harm to the non-debtor spouse.92 Although trustees can satisfy 
the first two requirements with relative ease, 93 they generally cannot prove 
that selling the entirety property, which is typically the family home, will not 
unduly burden the non-debtor spouse. 94 Thus, they generally are prevented 
from selling the property. 95 
90 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(t)(2). 
91 This is consistent with the rights that separate creditors traditionally have had under 
state laws. That is, the ability of creditors to satisfy their debts from the property was se-
verely curtailed even in jurisdictions that allowed separate creditors to reach entirety prop-
erty. Although some individual creditors could levy upon entirety property to reach both 
the debtor spouse's present and survivorship interest in the property, the creditor's interest 
would be subject to the non-debtor spouse's right of survivorship. See Yzenbaard, supra 
note 42, at 102 & n.22. In such a case, the creditor is considered to be a co-tenant with 
the non-debtor spouse but cannot immediately partition the property to satisfy the debt. 
See id. The right to reach the debtor spouse's survivorship interest allows a creditor to 
satisfy the debt only if the debtor spouse survives the non-debtor spouse. See id. Thus, a 
wife's absolute right of survivorship in entirety property gave her limited protection from 
her husband's improvident actions. See C.J. Messerschmidt, Case Comment, Beall v. 
Beall-The Effect of One Spouse's Death on an Offer to Sell Property Held as Tenants by 
the Entireties, 42 Mo. L. REV. 508, 515-16 (1983). 
92 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(h)(l)-(3). 
93 Because most property held by the entirety consists of family homes, it is often diffi-
cult to partition such property. See In re Gauthreaux, 206 B.R. 502, 505 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 1997); In re Addario, 53 B.R. 335, 338 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); see also In re Grif-
fin, 123 B.R. 933, 935 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991). Likewise, because many state laws limit 
the creditor's (or, in bankruptcy, the estate's) interest in the entirety property to the right 
of survivorship, trustees can easily show that selling the undivided interest in the entirety 
property would realize significantly less for the estate than selling the property free of the 
non-debtor's interest. See Gauthreaux, 206 B.R. at 506; In re Trout, 146 B.R. 823, 829 
(Bankr. D. N.D. 1992). 
94 Courts frequently consider non-economic factors when valuing the "detriment" to the 
non-debtor spouse, making it extremely difficult for trustees to establish the third require-
ment. See generally In re Harris, 155 B.R. 948, 950 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (collecting 
cases); cf In re Persky, 893 F.2d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 1989); Gauthreaux, 206 B.R. at 506 
(involving tax consequences if property was sold); In re Waxman, 128 B.R. 49, 53 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Coombs, 86 B.R. 314, 318 (D. Mass. 1988) (citing non-
debtor spouse's disability in holding that the benefit to the estate did not outweigh the det-
riment to the non-debtor spouse). 
95 The trustee must also give the non-filing spouse the right of first refusal. See 11 
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If marriage is treated as a merger and all debts of either spouse are 
deemed to be incurred jointly, then creditors should also be able to treat the 
spouses' assets as joint and to satisfy debts from entirety property. Such a 
rule would require only a moderate alteration of the Code, which currently 
incorporates state entirety laws. Congress is not required to recognize the 
tenancy in the bankruptcy context merely because state law recognizes it. 96 
And, although not immediately obvious, this approach satisfies the Supreme 
Court mandate instructing bankruptcy courts to interpret state laws in a way 
that prevents a party from receiving a windfall simply because the dispute is 
resolved in a federal bankruptcy court rather than a state court. 97 The impe-
tus behind the Court's rule was to decrease forum-shopping, 98 an objective 
that could be realized more uniformly by treating all property held by the 
entirety similarly, regardless of state property law. 
In addition, Congress has elected either to modify or to ignore debtors' 
and creditors' state-created interests in debtors' assets in other contexts if 
doing so would further bankruptcy policy. 99 This approach furthers the con-
u.s.c. § 363(i). 
96 See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979) ("The constitutional authority of 
Congress to establish 'uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
States' would clearly encompass a federal statute" that redefined a creditor's interest in 
property of the estate.); see also In re Jeffers, 3 B.R. 49, 56 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1980) 
("There is no doubt that Congress can, through its constitutional authority to establish 
'uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States,' change state-
created property rights.") (citation omitted). 
97 See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55 (indicating that state law should govern in federal bank-
ruptcy cases to prevent forum shopping and windfalls). 
98 For a general discussion of the need to prevent forum shopping in bankruptcy dis-
putes, see Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the 
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured 
Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 103 (1984) (arguing that bankruptcy law 
should not provide debtors with a means of avoiding substantive law); Douglas G. Baird, 
Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 815, 824-28 (1987) (discussing some of the problems associated with forum shopping 
in the bankruptcy context); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements 
and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 899-906 (1982) (providing reasons for re-
taining substantive property laws in bankruptcy); cf Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured 
Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1945-46 (1994) (responding to Baird and Jack-
son). 
99 For example, a trustee has the right, under 11 U.S.C. § 544, to avoid liens as a hy-
pothetical creditor even though creditors cannot avoid liens under state law. In addition, 
the Code gives trustees the right to avoid certain pre-petition transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 
547(b) even though no state law analogue to section 547 exists. Finally, the United States 
Supreme Court, in United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983), concluded 
that the IRS was required to return property seized from the debtor before the debtor filed 
for bankruptcy even though the debtor had no right to force the IRS to return the property 
under applicable state law. See id. at 208-12. 
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stitutional mandate to create a unified federal collection system that operates 
independent of the vagaries and inconsistencies of various state laws. 100 
Therefore, although Congress has chosen to recognize state-defined property 
rights, the Constitution does not require federal recognition of state property 
laws' in the context of bankruptcy .101 Furthermore, giving creditors access 
to entirety property is consistent with the view that spouses merge at mar-
riage and do not have separate property or debts and most likely will also be 
more effective than current law in meeting the constitutional requirement to 
institute a uniform national collection system. 
d. Exempting Property or Claiming Expenses for Non-Debtor Spouse 
The impact of the fact that Congress has given debtors the right to choose 
either state or federal law as governing bankruptcy exemptions, 102 as well as 
givi~g states the right to determine whether their residents have this 
choice, 103 can be seen by examining some of the property that debtors can 
exempt. In states that permit debtors to choose federal exemptions, 104 a 
debtor may exempt certain property used by a "dependent. " 105 The Code 
includes spouses in the definition of "dependent," therefore implicitly al-
lowing the non-filing spouse to receive this benefit "whether or not actually 
dependent. " 106 Thus, regardless of the non-filing spouse's actual economic 
dependence on the filing spouse, a debtor can exempt property that his 
100 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See also Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. 
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (discussing preemption under the Supremacy 
Clause); In re Baker & Drake, Inc., 35 F.3d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1994); In re DiGiorgio, 
200 B.R. 664, 669 (C.D. Ca. 1996) ("The Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws that 
interfere with or are contrary to federal law . . . . Preemption of state law by federal 
bankruptcy law is more likely where 'a state statute facially or purposefully carves an ex-
ception out of the Bankruptcy Code .... "'). 
101 The exemptions allowed under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) operate independently of any ex-
emptions provided for by the states. See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 642 
(1992). Although more than half of the states have opted out of the bankruptcy exemption 
scheme, Congress was not required to give states the choice to opt-out. See 4 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY 1 522.02(1], at 522-12, 522-13 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1998) 
(noting that, despite the appearance that the opt-out system violates the constitutional re-
quirement that bankruptcy law be uniform, it has so far withstood constitutional scrutiny). 
Indeed, a report prepared by the National Bankruptcy Review Commission proposes that 
Congress enact uniform federal exemptions. See 1 NATIONAL BANKR. REVIEW COMM., 
BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT 20 YEARS § 1.2.1, at 121-124 ( 1997) (recommending the elimi-
nation of section 522's opt-out provision). 
102 See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (b)(l). 
103 See id. 
104 See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 101, at , 522.02(1) n.3 (listing states 
that prohibit the election of federal exemptions). 
1os See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). 
106 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(l). 
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spouse uses as a residence. 107 The debtor may also exempt a limited amount 
of jewelry and professional supplies used by the non-debtor spouse. 108 
In addition, a debtor may exempt certain retirement benefits if he can 
show that this income is "reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor 
and any dependent of the debtor. "109 Debtors may also treat non-debtor 
spouses as financial dependents when preparing their budgets in Chapter 13 
cases, regardless of the non-debtor spouse's income. 11° For a Chapter 13 
plan to be confirmed, a debtor must show that all "disposable income" will 
go to making plan payments. 111 The Code defines disposable income as in-
come received by the debtor that is not "reasonably necessary to be ex-
pended" for the maintenance or support of the debtor or his dependents. 112 
Although many courts include a non-Hling spouse's income among the fac-
tors that determine the amount of "reasonably necessary" expenses a Chapter 
13 debtor can include in a proposed budget, 113 the Code does not require that 
non-debtor spouses prove that they are incapable of paying their own ex-
penses. Likewise, the Code does not give bankruptcy courts the authority to 
instruct "dependent" homemaker spouses to help alleviate the family's finan-
cial distress by earning wages outside the home or to tell a dependent wage 
earning spouse to find a higher-paying job. In short, despite the increased 
bankruptcy exemption afforded by claiming that a non-debtor spouse is a de-
pendent, the Code does not require debtors to prove that their spouses are, in 
fact, economically dependent; nor does the Code enable bankruptcy courts to 
order a non-debtor dependent spouse to break that dependency. 
The problem with the Code as currently written is that it does not adopt a 
consistent treatment of the property of married couples. If marriage is 
viewed as a merger and the spouses have a "traditional" marriage where one 
spouse earns all wages, owns all assets, and incurs all debts, the wage earner 
spouse should be allowed to protect items used by the dependent non-filing 
spouse in bankruptcy because, by definition, the non-debtor spouse will be a 
dependent. If the Code forces spouses to file joint petitions or substantively 
107 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(1), (d)(1). 
108 See 11 U.S.C § 522(d)(4), (6) (permitting an exemption for $1,000 in jewelry and 
$1,500 in professional supplies). 
109 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E); see also In re Velis, 123 B.R. 497, 511-12 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. 1991), rev'd in part, aff'd in relevant part, 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1991) (discussing 
§ 522(d)(l0) and referring to the "Bankruptcy Code fiction that a non-debtor spouse is a 
dependent of the debtor spouse regardless of actual dependency"). 
110 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A) (excluding resources used for the maintenance or 
support of a dependent of the debtor from the definition of disposable income). 
111 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(l)(B). 
112 See 11 U.S.C. § l325(b)(2)(A). 
113 Chapter 13 debtors must disclose their spouses' incomes on their bankruptcy sched-
ules. See Schedule I, Current Income of Individual Debtor(s). See infra note 200 
(discussing cases). 
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consolidate their assets, it should also give the breadwinner debtor spouse the 
benefit of exempting property because of the presumed dependency of the 
non-debtor spouse. Conversely, if Congress does not impose such burdens 
on non-filing spouses, the non-filer should not receive the benefit of pre-
sumed dependency and should be required to prove that she is economically 
dependent on the filing spouse, owns no separate property, and earns no 
wages. 
B. Marriage as an Arm's Length Contractual Arrangement 
1. Non-Bankruptcy Law 
One approach that Congress could take toward developing a consistent 
view of marriage in the Code would be to view marriages as arm's length 
contracts and to conclude presumptively that spouses owe each other nothing 
absent a written contract stating otherwise. This approach has not yet been 
fully explored because traditionally, at common law, marriage was defined 
by both the State and the Church, and courts were loath to view a relation-
ship as venerable as marriage as a "mere" contract.l 14 Further, because the 
separate "existence of the woman" was legally erased during marriages at 
common law, husbands could not enter into legally enforceable contracts 
with their wives, even if they chose to do so. 115 Modem judges feared that 
recognizing market-like contracts, such as those releasing a husband from 
obligation to provide economic support to his wife or enforcing an obligation 
on the husband's part to pay his wife for domestic services, would cause 
married couples to approach marriage strategically rather than as a venerable 
institution. 116 
As a result, many courts routinely held that wives had a legal obligation to 
perform domestic services and thus that interspousal contracts were void for 
lack of consideration. 117 Other courts held that husbands had a duty to sup-
port their wives and that contracts negating this duty were unenforceable on 
114 See Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Play-
ing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 
67, 116 (1993) ("Contract is sometimes thought to be too crass or too masculine a model 
for a relationship as venerable as marriage."). 
115 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *430. Such a contract would be nothing more 
than a legal fiction, as well as unenforceable, because the contracting parties would be the 
husband (as a legally competent contracting party) and the husband (as the representative 
of his legally incompetent wife). 
116 See sources cited infra note 249. 
117 See id.; see also WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 338. Because a dependent wife could 
have no assets of her own, the only thing she could offer as consideration would be the 
domestic services she performed. However, because the law deemed such work to be a 
pre-existing duty of marriage, it could not supply consideration. 
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public policy grounds. 118 In addition to questioning the incentives created by 
such contracts, judges deemed themselves incompetent to interpret contracts 
that governed intimate interspousal affairs, such as who would do the laun-
dry, how many children, if any, a couple planned to have, or where a couple 
would spend holidays. 119 Finally, judges were concerned that, if they agreed 
to interpret and enforce interspousal contracts, an avalanche of such contract 
disputes would overwhelm the courts.12o 
Despite the weight of tradition, some family law scholars argue that mar-
riage is best viewed as a contract. 121 They suggest that, because modern 
couples seek an emotionally fulfilling relationship governed by their own 
private preferences and choices, they should be allowed to order all aspects 
of their personal relationship, including selecting the grounds and process for 
terminating the relationship. 122 Another basis for the argument that marriage 
is more accurately characterized as a contractual relationship involves the 
obligations that spouses undertake voluntarily, thus restricting their freedom 
in the future. Such obligations include foregoing career opportunities to stay 
at home to rear children or foregoing time spent with small children in order 
to earn money outside the home. Under such a characterization, the spouses 
invest jointly in "specific assets" available only within the context of a long-
term marriage. 123 Spouses willingly make such sacrifices because they be-
118 See sources cited infra note 249. 
119 See generally Reva Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating 
Wives' Right to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2209 (1994) (noting that few 
spouses seek to enforce such contracts and that few courts would be likely to enforce them 
if they did). 
120 See Starnes, supra note 114, at 116. 
121 See Schneider, supra note 20, at 1858 (arguing that family law's movement toward 
contract comports with spouses' tendency to view the family as a "collection of individuals 
united temporarily for their mutual convenience and armed with rights against each 
other"); see also REGAN, supra note 26, at 35 ("Modern family law has steadily moved 
toward contract as its governing principle."). 
122 See id.; cf Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Di-
vorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 21 (1990) (discussing how options should be kept open in terms 
of entering, remaining in, and exiting a relationship); Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating 
Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, UTAH L. REV. 687, 706 (1994) (describing family law 
as "matters of family life" in which the state "should not interfere"). Professor Scott ar-
gues that, by removing fault from all aspects of divorce proceedings, the law obscures the 
character of the marriage relationship as one of moral obligation and commitment in which 
spouses have expectations about fidelity and devotion. See id. at 709. 
123 See Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; or, "/ Gave Him the Best 
Years of My Life," 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 269 (1987); see also Katherine K. Baker, 
Contracting for Security: Paying Married Women what They've Earned, 55 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1193, 1226 (1988) (arguing that a woman's contribution as a homemaker should be 
viewed as having economic value and proposing a contract model to compensate home-
makers, not only for the contributions made to the marriage, but also for opportunities 
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lieve that the aggregate benefit produced by the marital arrangement will ex-
ceed the "combined benefit each [spouse] could attain on his or her own. "124 
As a result, the marital relationship contributes to each spouse's personal ful-
fillment and the spouses' mutual sacrifices create a high level of trust be-
tween the spouses, reinforcing the belief that they have made a binding 
commitment to one another concerning their rights both during and after the 
marriage. 125 
For several reasons, many feminist scholars reject the idea that marriage 
should be viewed simply as a contract. First, it is far from clear that people 
marry simply to maximize their financial wealth rather than for the benefits 
of being in a shared and committed emotional relationship. 126 Second, cou-
ples do not typically engage in the self-interested adversarial bargaining that 
typifies arm's length transactions, and critics therefore argue that such a 
characterization of an intimate relationship like marriage is unrealistic. 127 
Third, critics note the likelihood that wives will be more harmed than they 
will be helped if marriage is viewed as a contract because of the greater eco-
nomic leverage that husbands typically have in marriage. 128 Fourth, because 
husbands tend to have greater bargaining power, critics argue that divorcing 
mothers may be forced to sacrifice their economic interests in exchange for 
custody of their children. 129 Such a sacrifice, critics argue, could be devas-
tating to some women, as women tend to be less well compensated in the 
market than men, and this fact has led some economists and many couples to 
conclude that it only makes economic sense for wives to remain home to rear 
foregone and disappointed reliance on the expected security of the marriage). 
124 Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, supra note 122, at 720. 
125 See id. (discussing the relationship between freedom and trust in a marriage). Be-
cause of the ease of no-fault divorce, some scholars contend that spouses may choose not 
to invest heavily in a marital partnership due to a belief that they will receive the same 
award at divorce whether they were the "good" or "bad" spouse. See WEITZMAN, supra 
note 26, at 30 ("The economic messages of the new law are clear: it no longer 'pays' to 
invest in the marital partnership .... "). 
126 See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Comment on lana Singer's Alimony and Efficiency, 
82 GEO. L.J. 2461, 2464-65 (1994). 
127 See REGAN, supra note 26, at 149. 
128 See id. at 150; WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 242, 246-48 (discussing the "double-
edged sword" of a contract model). 
129 See Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 Mo. L. 
REV. 497, 515-16 (1988) (noting that some parents, in the heat of divorce, may "barter the 
child's welfare for their own financial advantage"); Cheri L. Wood, Childless Mothers?-
The New Catch-22: You Can't Have Your Kids and Work for Them Too, 29 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 383, 404-06 (1995) (discussing the periodic use of custody as a "bargaining chip"). 
For an expansive discussion of how alimony questions are related to this problem, see Ira 
M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1992), and Jana B. Singer, 
Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic Justification for 
Alimony, 82 GEO. L. J. 2423,2428-37 (1994). 
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children. 130 Finally, viewing marriage as a matter of private contractual 
agreements ignores both the non-economic components of marriage and the 
effects a marriage contract may have on non-contracting third parties, such 
as children and other family members. 13I 
Courts traditionally refused to enforce pre- or post-marital contracts. 
Given the increased use of prenuptual agreements and the rising divorce rate, 
courts now routinely recognize the validity of these agreements. 132 Many 
courts and commentators remain concerned, however, that encouraging 
spouses to define their duties to each other via contract "promote[s] an alien-
ated, cynical view of marriage that debases its intimate nature. " 133 
2. Marriage as a Contract in Bankruptcy 
The Code does not adopt an internally consistent approach toward charac-
130 See REGAN, supra note 26, at 159-60. This view troubles some feminist scholars 
because it legitimizes the continuing gendered roles in marriage. 
131 See id. at 151 (discussing the inadequacy of contract law when confronted with the 
emotional issues implicit in divorce). 
132 See id. at 37 (noting courts' willingness to enforce marital contracts); see also Brigid 
McMenamin, 'Til Divorce Do Us Part: A Good Prenuptial Agreement May Not Be Very 
Romantic, But It Can Save a Lot of Grief, FORBES, Oct. 14, 1996, at 52. Section 306 of 
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act advises courts to enforce a written separation 
agreement unless that agreement is unconscionable. See UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND 
DIVORCE ACT, § 306, 9A U.L.A. 216. A number of states have either adopted UMDA § 
306 or a substantially similar provision. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-925 (1997); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.190 (Michie 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-608 (1995); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 52B-7 (1996); In re Marriage of Manzo, 659 P.2d 669, 671 (Colo. 1983) 
(upholding a separation agreement that was "fair, just and reasonable"); Simmons v. 
Simmons, 396 N.E.2d 631, 633-34 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Voigt v. Voigt, 670 N.E.2d 
1271, 1277 (Ind. 1996); Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); We-
ber v. Weber, 548 N.W.2d 781, 783 (N.D. 1996); Penhallow v. Penhallow, 649 A.2d 
1016, 1021-22 (R.I. 1994). 
Although certain elements of marriage can now be governed by private contractual 
agreements, judicial intervention still plays an unavoidable role. For example, although 
parties may divorce at will, only the court system can officially terminate a marriage. 
Likewise, parties cannot delegate or assign the personal rights or obligations of marriage. 
See Cohen, supra note 123, at 271-72. 
133 Starnes, supra note 114, at 116; see also Archer v. Archer, 493 A.2d 1074, 1077 
(Md. 1985) (noting that "[o]ther courts have said that efforts to characterize spousal con-
tributions as an investment or commercial enterprise deserving of recompense demean the 
concept of marriage"); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 533 (N.J. 1982) (refusing to 
"support reimbursement between former spouses in alimony proceedings as a general 
principle"); Lesman v. Lesman, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935, 939 (App. Div. 1982) (characterizing 
marriage as "more than an economic undertaking"). But see Borelli v. Brusseau, 12 Cal. 
App. 4th 647, 658 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (Poche, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority's 
view that enforcement of an interspousal contract degrades the spouse providing the serv-
ice and reduces that spouse to little more than a hired servant). 
1998] MARRIAGE IN BANKRUPTCY 991 
terizing the economic relationship between non-debtor and filing spouses, in-
stead treating the relationship for some purposes as one between independent 
contracting parties and for other purposes as one deserving of special status-
based legal treatment. Married couples benefit from being treated differently 
from other economically connected entities in several contexts of a bank-
ruptcy case. For example, because the Code does not require couples to file 
a joint bankruptcy petition, 134 the filing spouse is allowed to discharge debts 
for goods and services that benefited the non-filing spouse, and the creditors 
are prevented from reaching the assets held by the non-filing spouse.l35 
Likewise, even if both spouses file separate bankruptcy petitions, many 
courts interpret the Code to allow each of the spouses to claim separate prop-
erty as exempt, thus doubling the total amount of property excluded from the 
reach of creditors. 136 Finally, creditors of a Chapter 12 or 13 debtor gener-
ally cannot attempt to collect consumer debts137 from anyone jointly liable 
with the debtor until the Chapter 12 or 13 case is closed, dismissed, or con-
verted to a Chapter 7 or 11 case. 138 As long as the co-signer acted as a 
guarantor and received no direct benefit from the debt, Congress temporar-
ily139 prevents creditors from collecting the debt. Although the purpose of 
this policy is to insulate debtors from any indirect pressure exerted by credi-
tors who would otherwise pursue innocent friends or relatives who co-signed 
134 See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (discussing joint filing). 
135 See id. 
136 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(m). At least one court refused to allow married couples to 
"stack" exemptions provided under state law. See First Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 701 F.2d 
902, 905 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding section 522(m) inapplicable to debtors in a state that 
opted out of the federal exemptions of 522(d)). Other courts conclude that each spouse is 
entitled to separate exemptions. See In re Miller, 167 B.R. 782, 783 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1994) (allowing a husband and wife to take duplicate exemptions for the same car even 
though the wife held sole title). The court in In re Cheeseman, 656 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 
1981), held that a husband and wife who filed a joint petition and lived together should 
receive a householder exemption under state law because to do otherwise would likely dis-
courage "couples in financial trouble from weathering the storm together." Id. at 63. In 
such cases, both spouses are required to exempt property under the same law (either fed-
eral or state). See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). 
137 A consumer debt is defined as a debt incurred primarily for personal, family, or 
household purposes. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(7). 
138 Creditors are allowed to collect the debt if (1) the co-debtor became liable on the 
debt in the ordinary course of her business; (2) the debt was actually designed to benefit 
the co-debtor; (3) the debtor's Chapter 13 plan does not propose to pay the creditor in full; 
or (4) the creditor would be irreparably harmed if it is not allowed to collect the debt. See 
11 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(1), (c)(1)-(3); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (providing protection for 
co-debtors in Chapter 12 family farmer cases). 
139 Creditors may petition the court for relief from a stay in order to collect the debt 
from the co-obligor and can pursue the co-obligor for any deficiency amount if the debtor 
fails to repay the creditor in full. See 11 U.S.C. § 1301(c). 
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the debt as a favor, 140 it benefits both filing and non-filing spouses by pro-
tecting the non-filing, co-signer spouse from creditors. 
In other circumstances, however, the Code views married couples as con-
tracting parties that bargained for a binding allocation of risk and debt that 
was advantageous to both and that granted priority to specific creditors. The 
Code adopts this view without regard to what the actual economic relation-
ship between the spouses entailed. For example, Chapter 13 debtors can 
propose a debt repayment plan that gives favorable treatment to creditors 
who hold unsecured claims for co-signed consumer debts without regard to 
the co-obligor's ability to help the debtor repay that debt. 141 This treatment 
theoretically increases the debtor's incentives to devote all future income to 
making plan payments by alleviating the need to pay the co-signed debt in 
full in order to protect a friend or loved one. 142 Although debtors can thus 
"favorably" treat co-signed claims, courts generally disallow this treatment 
where it appears that the debtor has filed for bankruptcy solely to repay co-
140 See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 426 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6381. 
141 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1). Giving payment priority to certain unsecured creditors 
generally violates the section 1322(b)(1) prohibition against unfair "discrimination." 
Courts generally apply a four factor test to determine if discrimination would be appropri-
ate in a given case: (1) Does the discrimination have a reasonable basis? (2) Can the debtor 
carry out a plan without such discrimination? (3) Is the discrimination proposed in good 
faith? and (4) How does the plan treat other creditors? See, e.g., In re Martin, 189 B.R. 
619, 627 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995); In re Bradley, 109 B.R. 182, 183 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
1990). 
Courts have accepted plans that propose repaying joint unsecured debts in full and re-
paying less than ten percent of the value of other unsecured debts. See, e.g., In re Gon-
zales, 172 B.R. 320, 328 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1994); In re Dornon, 103 B.R. 61, 65 
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Todd, 65 B.R. 249, 253 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986); see also 
In re Perkins, 55 B.R. 422, 425-26 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1985) (weighing the standard four 
factors and holding that a plan which paid one creditor one hundred percent and the others 
approximately twenty-two percent did not unfairly discriminate). But see In re Battista, 
180 B.R. 355, 357 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1995) (rejecting a plan that paid co-debtor claims in 
full but paid other unsecured claims only six percent); In re Chapman, 146 B.R. 411, 418 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992). 
142 See In re Cheak, 171 B.R. 55, 57-58 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1994) (discussing Congress' 
"practical" concerns regarding cosigned debts); Gonzales, 172 B.R. at 327 (indicating that 
allowing discrimination between claims supports the public policy of encouraging the 
payment of child support); In re Easley, 72 B.R. 948, 956 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987) 
(refusing to confirm a plan that discriminated in favor of a cosigned debt because the 
debtor failed to justify the discrimination); Todd, 65 B.R. at 253 (noting that disallowing 
discrimination would chill debtors from seeking the relief bankruptcy provides); see also 
Perkins, 55 B.R. at 425-26 (expressing concern over the success of a plan if discrimination 
was not permitted). But see In re Martin, 189 B.R. 619, 628 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) 
(noting the potential for abuse inherent in the "carve-out" provision). 
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signed debts. 143 
The advantage of this arrangement can be seen from the following exam-
ple: A husband and wife co-sign a $10,000 consumer loan from a bank. The 
husband subsequently files a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case and proposes a plan 
that will make plan payments of $30,000 over a three year period. The hus-
band's debts include $10,000 in secured debt, the $10,000 loan, and an ad-
ditional $90,000 in unsecured debt. Based solely on these facts, the plan 
should distribute $10,000 in total payment for the secured claim, 144 and then 
make a pro rata monthly distribution to each unsecured creditor. Thus, the 
bank should receive ten percent of the monthly plan payments. Because the 
bank would receive only ten percent of the $20,000, or $2,000, it would 
need to go after the wife for the remaining $8,000. 
If, however, the husband chooses to treat the co-signed debt favorably by 
proposing that the bank receive a total of $10,000 over the three year plan 
payment period, the bank would be paid in full, leaving the wife, as co-
signer, free of any further obligations. Essentially, allowing the husband to 
treat the bank's loan favorably forces the husband's other creditors to sacri-
fice $8,000 of the moneys due them simply because the husband wants to 
protect the wife from the bank. Moreover, in this example, the bank re-
ceives the same treatment as the secured creditor, even though the Code an-
ticipates that only creditors holding secured claims have the right to demand 
that they essentially be paid in full.l45 
Congress has failed to create a consistent policy with respect to marriage 
by treating married couples both as independent contracting parties and as a 
single entity that enjoys status based privileges that arm's length parties do 
not. If Congress chooses to view marriage as an arm's length contract, then 
the Code should uniformly treat couples as business parties, and in the ab-
sence of explicit contractual agreements to the contrary, a filer's non-debtor 
spouse should receive benefits no greater than those given to creditors and 
other unrelated parties in interest. 146 Concomitantly, a non-debtor spouse 
should not have to assume any greater burdens than those imposed on a busi-
ness party and, absent an enforceable duty imposed by a written agreement, 
courts would not be allowed to presume that she would support her spouse or 
143 See, e.g., In re Thompson, 191 B.R. 967, 970 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996); Cheak, 171 
B.R. at 56. Courts typically will not allow discrimination for a debt co-signed by a non-
debtor spouse with significant income. See Martin, 189 B.R. at 628. 
144 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (A plan must distribute property to a holder of a 
secured claim in an amount equal to the allowed amount of the claim.). 
145 See id. 
146 Where spouses have a pre-marital agreement, the non-filing spouse should still be 
treated as an insider in the filing spouse's bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) 
(defining "insider" to include a relative of the debtor). Even if the non-filer owes no li-
ability on her spouse's debts, she undoubtedly has access to more information about the 
filing spouse's day-to-day affairs than unrelated third parties. 
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contribute to debt repayment. 
C. Marriage as a Partnership 
1. Non-Bankruptcy Law 
Another characterization of marriage that some family law scholars have 
explored involves seeing modern marriage as an equal partnership of 
autonomous individuals, formed for the purpose of promoting the happiness 
of the two individuals largely free from external regulation. 147 If both part-
ners contributed equally to the marriage, the partnership model would pro-
mote marital sharing and altruistic behavior, both of which are considered 
essential not only for preserving marriages, but also for treating spouses eq-
uitably at divorce. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act148 adopts a view 
that essentially synthesizes the merger and partnership models of marriage. 
The Act defines marriage as a "personal relationship" between a man and a 
woman that arises from a civil contract "to which the consent of the parties is 
essential." 149 
In the business context, a partnership is generally defined as the associa-
tion of two or more persons who carry on a business for profit as co-
owners.150 Though marriage is not usually viewed solely as a profit-making 
venture, 151 several similarities between marital relationships and business 
partnerships have lead some scholars152 and courts 153 to posit that marriage 
147 See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for 
State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204, 250-53 (1982) (discussing the shift in societal views 
towards the role of marriage). See generally FINEMAN, supra note 26, at 18-19 (noting 
that earlier views of marriage protected the private unity of a husband and wife from state 
intrusion or regulation but suggesting that marriage currently exists as an institution pri-
marily to promote the happiness of a couple). 
148 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act is recognized in the following states: Ari-
zona, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana and Washington. See 
Marti E. Thurman, Note, Maintenance: A Recognition of the Need for Guidelines, 33 U. 
LOUISVILLE]. FAM. L. 971, 974 n.21 (1995). 
149 UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT§ 201, 9A U.L.A. 160 (1995). 
150 See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT§ 6(1) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 256. 
151 See, e.g., Dewitt v. Dewitt, 296 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Wise. 1980) (refusing to treat 
divorcing "parties as though they were strictly business partners, one of whom has made a 
calculated investment in the commodity of the other's professional training, expecting a 
dollar for dollar return"). 
152 See infra notes 173-174 and accompanying text. 
153 In Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), the Supreme Court of Hawaii charac-
terized marriage as "a partnership created with the partners' financial resources and indi-
vidual energies and efforts." /d. at 58; see also Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 533 
(N.J. 1982) ("Marriage is not a business arrangement in which the parties keep track of 
debits and credits, their accounts to be settled upon divorce. Rather, as we have said, 
'marriage is a shared enterprise, a joint undertaking ... [i]n many ways it is akin to a 
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should be treated as a partnership. Marriages, like business partnerships, are 
based on mutual trust and confidence between partners. 154 Spouses, like 
business partners, cannot be forced to continue the relationship against their 
wills. 155 Absent an agreement to the contrary, spouses and business partners 
have equal rights to share in the management and control of their respective 
partnerships. 156 Finally, like general partners who are jointly and personally 
liable for all partnership debts and obligations, 157 many spouses financially 
support each other158-either by choice or because such support is required 
by the doctrine of necessaries. 159 
Though states retain a "monopoly on the business of marriage crea-
tion," 160 they no longer treat marriage as a state-defined status existing solely 
to promote the societal good. 161 Most states, however, continue to charac-
terize marriage as a matter of "public concern" 162 based on the presumption 
partnership."') (citations omitted). 
154 But cf Sally S. Neely, Partnerships and Partners and Limited Liability Companies 
and Members in Bankruptcy: Proposals for Reform, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 271, 319 (1997) 
(discussing similarities between partnerships and marriages but noting that "[n]ot all part-
nerships are like marriages; many are just business deals among entities with differing 
skills, assets or attributes which they contribute to an enterprise"). 
155 See J. WILLIAM CALLISON, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AND 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS§ 15.04, at 15-10, 15-11 (1992 & Supp. 1995); see also Bohatch v. 
Butler and Binion, No. 95-0934, 1998 WL 19482 (Tex. Jan. 22, 1998). 
156 See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 401(t), 6 U.L.A. 52 (1994); UNIF. 
PARTNERSHIP ACT§ 18(e) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 526. 
157 See CALLISON, supra note 155, §14.02, at 14-4, 14-5. 
158 See In re Antoine, 208 B.R. 17, 20 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997) (accepting unemployed 
debtor's Chapter 13 plan that would be funded completely by the earnings of the non-
debtor wife); In re Sigfrid, 161 B.R. 220, 222 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993) (stating that an 
unemployed spouse may rely on non-debtor spouse's income to fund Chapter 13 plan so 
long as that income is regular and stable); see also CALLISON, supra note 155, § 2.03, at 
2-5, 2-6 (discussing the importance of trust between partners given the potential personal 
liability, shared profits and losses, and joint control of partnerships). 
159 It should be noted, however, that many states have abolished the doctrine, deter-
mining that it constitutes unconstitutional gender-based discrimination. See, e.g., Emanuel 
v. McGriff, 596 So.2d 578, 580 (Ala. 1992); Condore v. Prince George's County, 425 
A.2d 1011, 1019 (Md. 1981); North Ottawa Community Hosp. v. Kieft, 578 N.W.2d 267, 
273 (Mich. 1998); Govan v. Medical Credit Servs., Inc., 621 So.2d 928, 931 (Miss. 
1993); Schilling v. Bedford County Mem'l Hasp., Inc., 303 S.E.2d 905, 908 (Va. 1983). 
160 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993). 
161 See GLENDON, supra note 32, at 291-93; REGAN, supra note 26, at 89-97; see also 
Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, supra note 122, at 687 ("In the 
liberal state, individuals have freedom to pursue their own self-defined ends, and relation-
ships are voluntary and contractual. Much of the recent reform in family law ... reflects 
this vision."). 
162 See, e.g., Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) 
(indicating that marriage is distinguishable from business contracts because of public pol-
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that couples take on at least some amount of obligation to provide mutual 
support when they marry. 163 The view of marriage as a partnership devel-
oped after modern courts and legislators ceased giving husbands the absolute 
right to control all aspects of their wives' lives. 164 Courts, legislators, and 
scholars increasingly have adopted the view that marriage is more like a 
partnership than a merger. The reasons for this shift include: (1) the evolu-
tion of the economy from primarily agrarian to primarily industrial; 165 (2) 
the increased number of women earning wages outside the home; 166 (3) the 
shift away from viewing any person, including a wife, as nothing more than 
property; 167 (4) the idea that each spouse has separate rights; 168 (5) the 
icy concerns unique to marriage); Chandler v. Central Oil Corp., 853 P.2d 649, 653 (Kan. 
1993) (noting that the granting of annulments has fallen out of favor because the marriage 
relationship is a matter of public concern); see also Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 
163 (Pa. 1990) (McDermott, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's characteriza-
tion of marriage as a business contract and rejecting the view that marriage is a "mere 
contract for hire"). 
163 See, e.g., Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18. 
164 This evolution of legal doctrine respecting the status of wives is dramatically illus-
trated in the area of domestic assaults. However, practice may need to evolve significantly 
to catch up with this new legal standard. See Rhonda L. Kohler, The Battered Women and 
Tort Law: A New Approach to Fighting Domestic Violence, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1025, 
1029-30 (1992) (arguing that husbands are not held to the same standard of care toward 
spouses as they are to strangers and that states often bar tort actions on the basis of res ju-
dicata if an ex-wife fails to raise assault allegations during divorce proceedings). 
165 See Siegel, supra note 50, at 1092 (discussing the implications of the shift from an 
agrarian economy for marriages). As husbands increasingly left the family farm to earn 
wages in an industrial workplace, wives' work became less visible to them. Thus, the 
need for laws recognizing wives' worth became more pronounced. In fact, ante-bellum 
women's rights advocates argued that household labor should be viewed as valuable 
"work" to combat the view that husbands left the home to "work" while wives stayed at 
home and did nothing socially productive. See id. at 1093-94. 
166 A number of scholars and courts have noted the dramatic shift in the marriage rela-
tionship because of the increasing trend toward wage-earning wives. See e.g., WEITZMAN, 
supra note 2, at 177 ("[l]t is likely that as more married women enter full-time work, for 
more pay and at higher occupational levels, their roles, power, and authority within [the] 
family will continue to change."). See generally, Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 22 (Poche, 
J., dissenting) (The "assumption that only the rare wife can make a financial contribution 
to her family has become badly outdated in this age in which many married women have 
paying employment outside the home. A two-income family can no longer be dismissed as 
a statistically insignificant aberration."). 
167 See Crozier, supra note 30, at 28 (comparing the economic relationship between 
spouses in traditional marriages to that "between master and slave ... between a person 
and his domestic animal"). Once slavery was abolished, it became increasingly difficult to 
treat wives as property of their husbands. See Siegel, supra note 27, at 2201. This anal-
ogy is by no means a distinctly modern characterization of the status of wives. See John 
Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, in ESSAYS ON SEX EQUALITY 123, 217 (Alice S. 
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changing economic relationship between spouses; 169 and (6) a relaxation of 
society's adherence to morality shaped exclusively by traditional western re-
ligious beliefs. 170 Perhaps the biggest push to view marriage as a partnership 
came in the 1970s when scholars and lawyers began to recognize that stay-at-
home spouses were often harmed economically by no-fault divorce. 
Courts have increasingly accepted the argument that marriage should be 
treated as a partnership rather than as merger.•71 Specifically, as a step to-
ward attaining more equitable treatment of women at divorce, wives have ar-
gued that property acquired or earned by the marital partnership should be 
deemed jointly owned. 172 Under this approach, courts are asked to treat both 
Rossi ed., 1970) ("Marriage is the only actual bondage known to our law. There remain 
no legal slaves, except the mistress of every house."). 
168 See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 454 (1973) (holding that due process is violated 
when state law irrebuttably presumes that in-state student with a non-resident spouse is a 
non-resident); Newborn v. Morrison, 440 F. Supp. 623, 626-27 (S.D. Ill. 1977) (holding 
that a school violated a teacher's constitutional rights when it refused to renew her contract 
because of her husband's actions). 
169 See Glendon, supra note 26, at 698. 
170 See Schneider, supra note 20, at 1842-45 (discussing the waning influence of Chris-
tianity among some groups in society). 
171 The high-profile divorce of General Electric executive Gary C. Wendt and his wife 
Lorna J. Wendt is a recent example of courts attempting to place a value on the marital 
contributions of a stay-at-home wife. Mrs. Wendt demanded half of her now ex-husband's 
assets, arguing that her non-monetary contributions to the marriage made her an equal 
partner and that she was entitled to 50% of the marital assets at divorce. The trial judge 
gave her half of the couple's tangible assets and a portion of Mr. Wendt's pension and fu-
ture stock benefits. Both sides have appealed. See Diane E. Lewis, Value of Home Work: 
Lawyer Cites Economic Theory in Assessing a Spouse's Contribution Behind the Scenes, 
BosTON GLOBE, Dec. 9, 1997, at C1; see also William C. Symonds et al., Divorce Execu-
tive Style: Companies Are Getting Dragged into an Area of Fierce Combat, Bus. WK., 
Aug. 3, 1998, at 56, 57-59 (discussing the Wendt case and other divorces involving highly 
paid corporate executives and noting that companies are now structuring compensation ar-
rangements to prevent ex-spouses from acquiring company stock). 
172 Courts have not yet, however, gone so far as to deem the value of professional de-
grees and licenses a jointly held marital asset amenable to equitable division upon divorce. 
See Jones v. Jones, 454 So.2d 1006, 1009 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (professional degree not 
divisible); Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d 196, 201-02 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (degrees or 
licenses not divisible community property); In reMarriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 76-77 
(Colo. 1978) (MBA not "property"); Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So.2d 146, 150 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1983) (value of a degree too speculative to be divisible); In reMarriage of Wein-
stein, 470 N.E.2d 551, 555-56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (collecting cases); In reMarriage of 
McManama, 386 N.E.2d 953, 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 399 
N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 1980) (legal education not property); Ruben v. Ruben, 461 A.2d 733, 
735 (N.H. 1983) (holding "that the better rule is that a graduate degree acquired by one 
spouse during the course of a marriage is not considered an asset subject to division upon 
dissolution of the marriage"); Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 498 P.2d 1357, 1358 (N.M. 
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work in the home and in the market as contributions that benefit the joint fi-
nancial endeavor of marriage. 173 Accordingly, wives who remained home to 
rear children and care for their families would be considered to have accrued 
equal financial equity in the partnership, equity that courts would recognize 
when distributing assets in the context of divorce.174 
1972) (holding that a medical license is not community property); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 
603 P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1979) ("Clearly a professional degree or license is the intangible 
and indivisible 'property' of its holder and no other person has a vested interest therein."); 
Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (holding that a profes-
sional degree "is not a property right and is not divisible upon divorce"); cf In re Mar-
riage of Horstmann, 263 N. W .2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978) (holding that, although a law de-
gree itself is not property for the purposes of divorce, its "potential for increase in future 
earning capacity" is a distributable asset); Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847, 852 (Ky. 
1982) (refusing to hold that a degree is marital property but setting forth a formula to 
compensate the contributing spouse); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758 
(Minn. 1981) (refusing to hold a medical degree to be marital property but awarding wife 
compensation for support during marriage); Lynn v. Lynn, 453 A.2d 539, 542 (N.J. 1982) 
(holding that degrees and licenses earned during marriages may be factors in determining 
alimony, but that degrees and licenses are not themselves subject to distribution); Pacht v. 
Jadd, 469 N.E.2d 918, 922 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a trial court may divide a 
degree as a marital asset but that the failure to do so is not an abuse of discretion); 
Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 489 A.2d 782, 784-87 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (agreeing that a pro-
fessional degree is not distributable property but awarding wife alimony which reflected 
her past support); Wehrkamp v. Wehrkamp, 357 N.W.2d 264, 266 (S.D.1984) (holding 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to treat a degree as marital prop-
erty because its value was speculative); Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473, 477 (W. Va. 
1988) (agreeing that professional degrees and licenses are not marital property); Grosskopf 
v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 822 (Wyo. 1984) (agreeing that a degree is not property). 
173 See Mary Downey, Note, The Need to Value Homemaker Services upon Divorce, 87 
W. VA. L. REV. 115, 121 (1984) ("Marriage is recognized as an economic partnership 
with each spouse making his or her valuable monetary contributions."); see also 
WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 66-67 (noting that, although most married couples aspire to a 
relationship grounded upon sharing, forty two states largely negate the wife's contribu-
tions); Regan, supra note 26, at 2316 ("[A] theory of equitable distribution characterized 
wives, as well as husbands, as partners whose work during marriage contributed to house-
hold welfare."). 
174 See Regan, supra note 26, at 2314 ("The theory is that each spouse contributes a set 
of different but equally valuable resources toward the acquisition of assets, and therefore is 
entitled to a portion of the fruits of their labors."); see also Barry A. Schatz & Jacalyn 
Birnbaum, New State Promotes Homemakers' Rights, 80 ILL. B.J. 610, 610 (1992) ("The 
full contribution of a homemaker includes her 'enabling' function-the opportunities for 
the family that her efforts make possible."); Mark A. Sessums, What Are Wives' Contri-
butions Worth upon Divorce?: Toward Fully Incorporating Partnership into Equitable 
Distribution, 41 FLA. L. REV. 987, 991 (1989) ("Equitable distribution requires the court 
to distribute marital property upon divorce based upon a presumption that marriage is a 
partnership."); John R. Dowd, Comment, Defining the Doctrine of Equitable Distribution 
in Mississippi: A Rebuttable Presumption that Homemaking Services Are as Valuable to 
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Although treating marriage as a partnership theoretically benefits home-
maker wives, some women's advocates argue that the substantial structural 
differences between business and marital partnerships make this approach 
unrealistic. These critics challenge the partnership model because it (1) fails 
to provide a conceptual basis for alimony or future maintenance; (2) inade-
quately compensates "displaced" homemakers; (3) mischaracterizes marriage 
solely as a profit-seeking venture; and (4) does not acknowledge that busi-
nesses and marriages commence in different ways. 175 
Perhaps the primary criticism is that the partnership model fails to provide 
ongoing support for divorcing homemakers who sacrificed their careers to 
benefit their marriages .176 Historically, courts have refused to specify the 
minimum level of support husbands owed to their wives while married. 177 
Naturally, the biggest battles in divorce litigation have been over whether 
wives are entitled to ongoing spousal support or maintenance and over how 
much support they should receive. 178 Because no-fault divorce laws aim to 
give each spouse a clean break, both emotionally and financially, courts 
question why one spouse (usually the husband) should have a continuing ob-
ligation to support the other spouse. In the partnership model, a husband 
would not be required to provide future financial support to his ex-wife even 
if she had remained out of the workforce for the benefit of her husband and 
children in reliance on her expectation of the long term stability of the part-
nership.179 
A related criticism of the partnership model is that it rests on the errone-
ous assumption that a spouse who has sacrificed her career to remain home 
and care for her husband or family will be made whole by receiving fifty 
the Acquisition of Marital Property as Breadwinning Services, 16 MISS. C. L. REv. 479, 
502 (1996) (arguing that recent Mississippi Supreme Court decisions compensating home-
makers for their labor "signaled the Court's realization that homemaker services have le-
gitimate, compensable economic value, which should be accounted for upon divorce") 
(footnote omitted). 
175 See Sally Burnett Sharp, The Partnership Ideal: The Development of Equitable Dis-
tribution in North Carolina, 65 N.C. L. REV. 195, 199 (1987) (discussing and analyzing 
North Carolina's statutory implementation of equitable distribution of property upon di-
vorce); Starnes, supra note 114, at 108 (claiming that the partnership model rests on two 
basic principles-that divorce should be available at will and that it should completely 
sever emotional and financial ties between couples). 
176 See Regan, supra note 26, at 2315 (explaining that wives should demand that their 
marital contribution be treated as an earned property right rather than as a request to alle-
viate post-divorce hardship). 
177 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
178 See generally WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 45 (providing an overview of factors in-
volved in setting alimony). 
179 See Schatz & Birnbaum, supra note 174, at 610 (discussing Illinois's old "no fault" 
divorce statute, patterned after the partnership model, which left many former wives and 
their children impoverished). 
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percent of the partnership assets at divorce. Critics argue that a wife who 
has sacrificed her career either to the marriage or to the role of primary 
caretaker of the couple's children has been "damaged" economically by the 
partnership. 180 This damage is caused by the fact that, if a displaced home-
maker leaves the labor force for "any period," she "will probably never 
reach the income level she would have enjoyed through uninterrupted wage 
earning. " 181 
Critics of the partnership model also argue that it is unrealistic to treat 
marital partnerships like business partnerships in which the members deal 
with each other at arm's length and which are formed out of different mo-
tives. Business partners generally initiate their relationship by negotiation 
and commit to a comprehensive written partnership agreement that explains 
the purpose of the partnership, the manner in which gains and losses are to 
be allocated, and the terms governing dissolution of the partnership. 182 Al-
though some prospective spouses are routinely advised to execute prenuptial 
agreements, 183 most couples do not consult lawyers for premarital financial 
planning. 184 Moreover, even if couples use prenuptial agreements to distrib-
18° See Starnes, supra note 114, at 81. 
181 /d. 
182 See, e.g., BURTON J. DEFREN, PARTNERSHIP DESK BOOK § 110.1 (1978) ("Wise 
people set forth the nature of their business relationship, along with each individual's 
rights and obligations, before operations are commenced."); Herbert Kraus, General Part-
nership Agreements, in PARTNERSHIP AND JOINT VENTURE §5.02. 
183 These include a spouse who (1) has children fro~ previous relationships, (2) owns a 
business, (3) earns significantly more than the other spouse, or (4) has considerable assets. 
See Eric Schmuckler, Breaking up is Complex to Do (Financial Implications of Divorce 
Law), FORBES, Oct. 1988 at 360 (reporting that Raoul Felder, the "dean of big-money di-
vorces," calls pre-nuptial agreements "the name of the game"); see also Chambers, supra 
note 18, at 479 ("Most states now permit couples, at the point of marriage or during the 
marriage, to contract for a different arrangement on death or divorce than the law would 
otherwise impose."); Richard A. Epstein, A Last Word on Eminent Domain, 41 U. MIAMI 
L. REV 253, 271 (1986) ("Today of course marriages are much less status and more con-
tractual, and it is not surprising that antenuptial agreements have a far wider scope to play, 
especially in second marriages when either or both partners have substantial assets and 
children by previous marriage."); Herndon Inge, Jr., Antenuptial Agreements, 48 ALA. 
LAW. 140, 140 (1987) (suggesting that antenuptial agreements may be beneficial for 
wealthy prospective spouses and those with children from previous marriages); Linda S. 
Kahan, Note, Jewish Divorce and Secular Courts: The Promise of Avitzur, 73 GEO. L.J. 
193, 222 (1984) ('!Antenuptial agreements most commonly are associated with the very 
wealthy, or with older people who want to preserve their estates for children of a previous 
marriage."). 
184 Because drafting a prenuptial or antenuptial contract requires the assistance of an 
attorney, and the estimated cost of a prenuptial agreement ranges from $1,500 to $3,000, 
only prospective spouses who have significant assets to protect and who can afford to have 
a lawyer to protect those assets will use premarital contracts. See Gary Belsky, The Best 
Money Moves for Every Season of Your Life, MONEY MAG., Aug. 1, 1997, at 116. In-
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ute their assets at divorce, 185 marriages typically begin as an exchange of 
emotional, rather than financial, commitments. Finally, because marriage 
involves more than profit maximization, 186 it would be virtually impossible to 
draft a workable written agreement that could adequately plan for the future 
"success" of a marriage.187 
2. Marriage as a Partnership in Bankruptcy 
Congress could treat marriage as a partnership when deciding whether a 
non-debtor spouse must help repay a filing spouse's debts. Just as a general 
partner is not required to file a bankruptcy petition when the partnership 
files, l88 a non-filing spouse would not be required to file for bankruptcy sim-
ply because the debtor spouse does. However, as in business partnerships, 
there would be a presumption that both partners are personally liable for the 
deed, depending on the complexity of the couple's assets and interests, preparing the 
agreement conceivably could cost as much as $100,000. See Burton Young & Mitchell K. 
Karpf, In Addition to Safeguarding Inheritances, Pre-Nuptial Contracts Can Help Attor-
neys Protect Their Firm Ownership Interests, NATL. L. J., DEC. 15, 1997, at B7. 
185 Currently, an estimated five percent of the 2.4 million couples who marry each year 
sign prenuptial agreements. See Belsky, supra note 184, at 116; cf Symonds et al., supra 
note 171, at 60 (discussing poll results that indicate only 30% of high-ranking business 
people have signed a prenuptial agreement). 
186 See, e.g., Lesman v. Lesman, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935, 939 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) 
(Marriage "is more than an economic undertaking. The parties agree upon the manner in 
which they will provide financial support and nonfinancial services to each other, and they 
do not place values on their respective contributions, nor do they expect to pay each other 
for those contributions."). 
187 It is hard to imagine that a premarital agreement will ever be able to articulate the 
purpose of a particular marriage or how marriage "profits" are to be shared. 
188 Unfortunately, the Code does not adequately address the rights of debtor and non-
debtor partners when either a partnership or a general partner files a petition for relief in 
bankruptcy. See Neely, supra note 154, at 286 ("[G]iven the current state of federal bank-
ruptcy law ... inquiries regarding the effect of bankruptcy on partnerships or partners has 
been left to judicial development .... "). In general, the Code follows state partnership 
laws when determining the liabilities of partnerships and their general partners in bank-
ruptcy. Under most state partnership laws, each partner may be held personally liable for 
the full amount of partnership debts. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 306(a) 
(1994), 6 U.L.A. 45; UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT§ 15 (1914), 6 U.L.A. 456; see also Larry 
E. Ribstein, The Illogic and Limits of Partner's Liability in Bankruptcy, WAKE FOREST L. 
REv. 31, 31 (1997) (noting that personal liability is an important feature of partnerships 
and is imposed by state law). Thus, each partnership creditor has a claim against the part-
nership and against the general partners of that partnership. Because partnership creditors 
have priority over partners' individual creditors when distributing the partnership assets, 
creditors holding joint liability claims can sue both the partnership and the partners but 
may reach individual partner assets only after exhausting partnership assets. Once the 
partnership dissolves, partners must contribute toward the payment of partnership debts in 
proportion to their agreed loss shares. See id. at 34-36. 
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debts of the partnership. Under a partnership model, Congress should there-
fore revise the Code to create a presumption that requires non-filing spouses 
to help filing spouses pay partnership debts. The filing spouse would be able 
to rebut this presumption with conclusive proof that the debts involved did 
not in any way benefit either the non-filer or the partnership. Absent such 
proof, both spouses would be responsible for the debts sought to discharged. 
The non-filing spouse could meet the obligation for those debts either by re-
linquishing non-exempt assets in a Chapter 7 liquidation or earning market 
wages to help repay debts under a Chapter 13 plan. 
a. Financial Support by Non-Filing Partner 
Congress should require a non-debtor who receives either a direct or indi-
rect benefit from a debtor spouse's bankruptcy case to provide financial sup-
port to the debtor to avoid perverse incentives. Without this requirement, 
spouses will be able to title marital assets solely in one spouse's name or, if 
their state recognizes the entirety estate, hold their property as tenants by the 
entirety in order to separate their assets and place them beyond the reach of 
creditors. This strategy would provide an unearned benefit to the marital 
partnership in the following way: The primary wage earner would incur all 
debt in his name, file for bankruptcy, and then discharge debts (including 
those incurred for the dependent spouse). Creditors would not be able to 
reach entirety property and property the "dependent" non-filing spouse uses. 
This would allow spouses to walk away from most marital debts, yet keep 
potentially substantial assets. 
The problem with this scenario is that it is inconsistent with one of the 
primary goals of bankruptcy law, which seeks equitable, maximum debt re-
payment even if the debts can be only partially repaid over a period of 
time. 189 To avoid this result, Congress should force non-filing spouses to 
surrender non-exempt assets in Chapter 7 liquidations and to work in the 
market to help repay debts in Chapter 13 cases. 190 Although states have al-
189 Society has an interest in ensuring that non-debtor spouses who have the ability to 
help pay debtors be required to repay these debts because the costs of bankruptcy are not 
borne solely by creditors. Many, if not all, creditors pass the cost of discharged debts on 
to other customers through higher fees and interest rates. See Robert A. Hillman, Con-
tract Excuse and Bankruptcy, 43 STAN. L. REV. 99, 123 (1990) (arguing that customers 
bear the pain of discharge and excuse); cf Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47, 50-51 (1997) ("Ex ante, creditors 
can protect themselves with security interests, debt covenants, and other contractual provi-
sions; in the absence of the Bankruptcy Code's restrictions on waivers they could contrac-
tually provide for a post-insolvency division of assets."). 
190 Cf ln re Moix-McNutt, 215 B.R. 405, 407 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 1997) (reviewing the 
case's procedural history and noting that a bankruptcy judge directed the homemaker 
debtor to convert her case into a Chapter 11 petition with her husband's participation or 
face a Chapter 7 conversion). For a treatment of the analogous business situation, arguing 
that the general partners of a debtor partnership should be denied bankruptcy protections 
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ways been reluctant to regulate, supervise, or control a married couple's 
"private" affairs, I<ii Congress should regulate those affairs when a couple 
seeks public bankruptcy benefits. 192 Requiring a non-debtor spouse to sur-
render some assets or contribute income to a debtor spouse who has filed for 
bankruptcy to discharge marital debts is consistent with the partnership view 
of marriage. Moreover, this approach furthers public policy considerations 
both in and of bankruptcy and has been recognized in a number of court de-
cisions that are discussed in the following sections. 
i. Chapter 7 Dismissals Due to Non-Debtor Income 
Many courts will consider the income of a debtor's non-filing spouse when 
determining whether a debtor seeking a Chapter 7 discharge has the "ability 
to repay" 193 some of those debts through a Chapter 13 plan.I94 For example, 
unless they file for bankruptcy, see Ribstein, supra note 188, at 64-65. 
191 See Sheryl L. Scheible, Bankruptcy and the Modification of Support: Fresh Start, 
Head Start, or False Start?, 69 N.C. L. REv. 577, 582 (1991) ("While a marriage is in-
tact, the courts rarely dictate the extent of the duty" to support a spouse.). 
192 Professor Martha Fineman discusses the disingenuousness of regulating the affairs of 
single mothers who receive public assistance but not the affairs of married couples with 
children. See FINEMAN, supra note 26, at 190-91. She argues that the latter receive pub-
lic subsidies through government programs including federal loans, subsidized insurance 
benefits, and the ability to file joint income tax returns. See id. She posits that this regu-
lation disparity is due to the fact that the family form of two married parents with children 
conforms with socially accepted and expected norms. See id. 
193 Although I do not necessarily advocate this view, many argue that the ability to pay 
should be considered when courts rule on motions to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition for 
"substantial abuse" pursuant to 11 U .S.C. § 707(b). See Edith H. Jones & James I. 
Shepard, Additional Dissent to Recommendations for Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy 
Law, in 1 NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 101, at 1123, 1132-49 
(noting that some members of the Review Commission believed that relief under Chapter 7 
should be unavailable to those with the ability to repay debts); see also United States 
Trustee v. Harris, 960 F.2d 74, 77 (8th Cir. 1992) (dismissing a Chapter 7 petition in a 
case where the petitioners could pay 156% of their unsecured debt within three years); In 
re Green, 934 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1991) (adopting a "totality of the circumstances" 
test to determine whether a debtor can take advantage of Chapter 7's protections, rather 
than solely focusing on the debtor's solvency); In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 126 (6th Cir. 
1989) (noting that, although a debtor's ability to repay his debts might, by itself, warrant a 
Chapter 7 petition, other factors are also relevant under a "totality of the circumstances" 
approach); In re Piontek, 113 B.R. 17, 22 (Bankr. D. Or. 1990) (suggesting that courts 
dismiss Chapter 7 cases whenever a debtor can pay "all unsecured debts without undue 
hardship"); In re Edwards, 50 B.R. 933, 938 (Bankr. S.D.N. Y. 1985) (discussing the 
court's reasons for setting a "rather high screening standard for a debtor's entitlement to 
Chapter 7 relief'). 
Despite such rulings, most academics reject this approach. See Karen Gross, Preserv-
ing a Fresh Start for the Individual Debtor: The Case for Narrow Construction of the Con-
sumer Credit Amendments, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 100 (1986) (advocating a narrow 
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the court in In re Wilkinson 195 implicitly ruled that a debtor cannot receive 
Chapter 7 benefits if the debtor's spouse has income that could help repay 
debts. In Wilkinson, a debtor filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7, but 
her husband did not. 196 The debtor admitted that she intended to reaffirm 
(i.e., repay) all of her debts except one, which she had co-signed with her 
ex-husband. 197 Because the debtor's current husband had income sufficient 
to help the debtor pay her debts, the court refused to allow her to proceed in 
Chapter 7198 and concluded that a discharge under these circumstances would 
constitute an abuse of the bankruptcy system because it appeared that she 
filed solely to discharge the debt she co-signed with ex-husband. 199 
reading of the "substantial abuse" provision allowing courts to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition 
because "no provision within Chapter 7 prohibits an individual from seeking relief when 
she could be a debtor under Chapter 13 "); Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Limiting Access to 
Bankruptcy Discharge: An Analysis of the Creditors' Data, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1091, 
1115-18; Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Rejoinder: Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge, 
1984 WIS. L. REV. 1087, 1087-88 (challenging the conclusions of the Purdue Study, 
which asserted that most Chapter 7 debtors could repay some of their debts and, thus, 
should be forced into Chapter 13); Honorable Roger M. Whelan et al., Consumer Bank-
ruptcy Reform: Balancing the Equities in Chapter 13, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 165, 
190 (1994) (noting that the dismissal of a Chapter 7 case for abuse may constitute an in-
voluntary Chapter 13 mechanism). But see A. Charlene Sullivan, Reply: Limiting Access 
to Bankruptcy Discharge, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 1069, 1085 ("The bottom line is that a sig-
nificant portion of consumers filing under Chapter 7 could have repaid their debts over 
payment periods ranging from three to five years, even allowing for cushions over basic 
living expenses."). 
194 See, e.g., In re Smith, 157 B.R. 348, 350 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993) (observing that 
a court must consider the non-debtor spouse's income when it reviews the debtor's Chap-
ter 7 petition); In re Strong, 84 B.R. 541, 543 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988) (drawing parallels 
between the consideration of a non-debtor spouse's income in a Chapter 7 context and a 
Chapter 13 setting where "an accurate analysis of Chapter 13's disposable income test is 
impossible unless the income of a non-debtor spouse is included in the budget"); In re 
Kern, 40 B.R. 26, 28 (Bankr. S.D.N. Y. 1984) (rejecting a debtor's proposed Chapter 13 
plan because his wife could "afford to bear her share," despite her "old-fashioned" belief 
that a husband should be the family's sole provider). But cf In re Berndt, 127 B.R. 222, 
225 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1991) (holding that, where a debtor and a non-debtor spouse share a 
joint household, the non-debtor spouse's income should not be "rendered liable" for the 
filer's debts but should be considered in determining whether the debtor has available dis-
cretionary income to repay debts under a Chapter 13 plan). 
195 168 B.R. 626 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994). 
196 See id. at 627. 
197 See id. at 628. 
198 See id. at 629 (observing that, although "it is arguably no more fair for the Debtor 
to be stuck with the debt incurred by her deadbeat ex-husband, than it is for the creditor 
not to be paid," the debtor had the ability to pay without much hardship). 
199 See id. at 629. 
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ii. Chapter 13 Dismissals Due to Non-Debtor Income 
Because Chapter 13 debtors must use all of their "disposable income" to 
fund their plans, many courts also consider the non-debtor spouse's income 
when a married person submits his or her proposed Chapter 13 budget. 200 
Courts also reason that it is unfair to allow debtors to allocate separate in-
come to family necessities if the non-filing spouse's income would remain 
"disposable" to the debtor yet uncommitted to the plan.201 For example, the 
debtor in In re Caner202 failed to include her husband's income and expenses 
in her plan as required by federal bankruptcy law. 203 Without any statistical 
or factual basis, the court asserted "that married couples live as a unit, 
pooling their income and expenses. "204 Because the court concluded that the 
debtor would have access to her husband's income and that his income might 
be sufficient to pay her living expenses, the court refused to confirm the 
debtor's plan. 205 
iii. Confirmation of Chapter 13 Plan Funded by Non-Debtor's 
Income 
In other cases, bankruptcy courts have carefully considered non-debtor 
spousal income when a non-debtor spouse agrees to fund a filing spouse's 
Chapter 13 plan with her income. 206 The debtor in In re Antoine, for in-
200 See, e.g., In re Mathenia, 220 B.R. 427, 432 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998) (stating 
that the debtor's Chapter 13 plan could not be confirmed unless the debtor "employs a 
portion of his spouse's proportionate share of the family's disposable income"); In re 
Halper, 213 B.R. 279, 283 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997) (observing that, when most courts con-
sider a Chapter 13 plan, they consider the income and expenses of the debtor and non-
debtor spouse together); In re Cardillo, 170 B.R. 490, 491 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994); In re 
Velis, 123 B.R. 497, 511-12 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991), rev'd in part, ajf'd in relevant part, 
949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1991) (tracing a history of considering a non-debtor spouse's income 
in Chapters 7 and 13 and in student loan settings); In re Belt, 106 B.R. 553, 563 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ind. 1989) (noting that, although a debtor's Chapter 13 plan must include the non-
debtor spouse's income and expenses, not all excess income must go towards funding the 
Chapter 13 plan); Strong, 84 B.R. at 543; In re Saunders, 60 B.R. 187, 188 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 1986); Kern, 40 B.R. at 29; In re Sellers, 33 B.R. 854, 857 (Bankr. D. Col. 1983). 
But see In re Harmon, 118 B.R. 68, 69 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1990) (rejecting the trustee's 
argument that the non-d~btor spouse's income should be included and holding that the 
court did not have jurisdiction over the wife's assets or income). 
201 See In re Soper, 152 B.R. 985, 988 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993). 
202 205 B.R. 733 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996). 
203 See id. at 735 (citing Bankruptcy Form Schedules I and J). 
204 /d. at 736. 
205 See id. ("Without income and expense information from the debtor's husband we are 
unable to make a determination of the debtor's disposable income."). 
206 See, e.g., In re Antoine, 208 B.R. 17 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Cohen, 13 
B.R. 350, 351 & n.3 (Bankr. E.D. 1981) (including the income of the debtor's non-filing 
husband in the debtor's Chapter 13 plan); see also In re Sigfrid, 161 B.R. 220, 223 
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stance, was an unemployed carpenter who was completely dependent on his 
wife for financial support. 207 Although the debtor's wife did not file a bank-
ruptcy petition, the couple's joint mortgage obligation was the apparent 
catalyst for the husband's petition. 208 The wife testified that their household 
was maintained "as one" and that she was willing to help her spouse repay 
his debts. 209 Indeed, it appeared that the proposed plan would be funded 
solely by contributions from the debtor's wife. 210 The Chapter 13 trustee ar-
gued that the court could not confirm such a plan because the Code requires 
Chapter 13 debtors establish "regular income," and a filer without income 
would therefore be ineligible to file under Chapter 13.211 The court deter-
mined that the unemployed debtor had "regular income" based on his wife's 
"significant earnings," basing this on the fact that the couple's twenty-eight 
year marriage indicated the couple had a "long history of mutual support and 
a stable marital relationship. "212 
The surprising nature of these decisions can be seen by comparing them to 
distribution decisions in the context of divorce. In distributing marital assets, 
courts have traditionally been reluctant to value the services of full-time 
homemakers. 213 In Antoine, on the other hand, the court went to great 
(Bankr. Minn. 1993) (rejecting the debtor's Chapter 13 plan because there was insufficient 
evidence that the non-debtor spouse's income was stable or regular); In re Soper, 152 B.R. 
985, 988 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993) ("If ... the debtor were married, then his spouse's in-
come would be properly considered in determining his net available income for payment 
under the [Chapter 13] plan.") (citation omitted); In re Ellenberg, 89 B.R. 258, 263 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988) (noting that a non-debtor spouse's income and expenses are 
"relevant in cases where the debtor spouse is shouldering most of the expenses"). But cf 
In re Hanlin, 211 B.R. 147, 148 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1997) (rejecting an unemployed stu-
dent's Chapter 13 plan premised on parental contribution and stating that upholding his 
plan would "fly in the face of any sensible reading" of Chapter 13); In re Fischel, 103 
B.R. 44, 46 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989) (rejecting the debtor's Chapter 13 plan, despite the 
fact that the debtor and her non-debtor co-habitant lived together, shared their resources, 
and that the non-debtor gave the debtor money to pay her debts). 
207 See 208 B.R. at 18. 
208 See id. 
209 See id. at 19. 
210 See id. at 18 (noting the undisputed fact that the debtor had no current source of in-
come). 
211 See id. (reporting that the trustee stated that the debtor had no standing under Chap-
ter 13 because he had no regular income). 
212 In re Antoine, 208 B.R. 17, 20 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
213 See Downey, supra note 173; at 124 ("The efforts of the homemaker were ignored 
by common law and often regarded as expected duties of the wife."); Katharine Silbaugh, 
Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 61 (1996) 
(stating that, in a divorce context, "[h]ousework is again not simply undervalued, but is 
quite literally not valued"); see also Regan, supra note 26, at 2314 (1994) (discussing the 
changing views of homemaking contributions to a marriage); Suzanne Reynolds, Increases 
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lengths to expand the definition of income so that it would encompass vol-
untary payments made by one spouse to another. 214 However, the court in 
Antoine did not go so far as to hold that the non-debtor spouse's separate in-
come was marital income or that the non-debtor had a legal duty to help re-
pay her husband's debts. Nevertheless, the court's implicit assumption that 
the wife's income was available to her husband is consistent with imposing a 
duty on non-filing spouses to provide financial assistance when the non-
debtor benefits from the debtor spouse's bankruptcy filing. 
iv. Nondischargeability of Divorce Obligations Due to Current 
Spouse's Income 
Courts tend to consider the income of a debtor's current spouse when de-
ciding whether the debtor can use bankruptcy laws to discharge equitable 
distribution obligations or other non-support divorce obligations owed to a 
former spouse. Alimony, maintenance, and child support obligations are 
non-dischargeable in all bankruptcy cases.215 However, a Chapter 7 debtor 
may discharge non-support divorce debts by showing either that he cannot 
repay the debts or that paying the debts will harm him more than non-
payment will harm his ex-spouse.2t6 
Some courts have refused to consider the assets of a debtor's new spouse 
or cohabitant even if the new spouse or cohabitant owns property or has in-
come that could help the debtor satisfy non-support divorce obligations. 217 
However, most courts examine the debtor's entire current financial situation, 
including the assets of a co-habitant or new spouse. 218 For example, the 
in Separate Property and the Evolving Marital Partnership, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
239, 270 (1989) (discussing the treatment courts give "indirect" contributions to the mari-
tal partnership and the often-required "close 'causal' relationship between the efforts of the 
spouse and the increase in value"); Dowd, supra note 174, at 500 (reporting that, until 
1993, Mississippi courts failed to recognize "homemaker contributions" as valid contribu-
tions to a family's assets). 
214 But cf In re McMullan, 196 B.R. 818, 835 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996) (dismissing 
the Chapter 13 plan of a woman that the court characterized as "essentially a housewife" 
even though she received wages from the part time bookkeeping work she performed for 
her husband). 
215 See 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(5). 
216 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). 
217 See In re Willey, 198 B.R. 1007, 1015 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) (expressing concern 
over the "chilling" effect on courtship and remarriage if a new girlfriend's assets were to 
be included in disposable income); In re Carter, 189 B.R. 521, 522 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1995) (refusing to inquire into the finances of the debtor's new spouse because the inquiry 
would not alter the court's determination regarding the debtor's ability to pay his debts). 
218 See, e.g., In re Gamble, 143 F.3d 223, 226 (5th Cir. 1998); In re Halper, 213 B.R. 
279, 284 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997) (stating that the court's determination of a debtor's situa-
tion "mandates consideration of the income of a live-in companion"); In re Koons, 206 
B.R. 768, 773 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997); In re Celani, 194 B.R. 719, 721 (Bankr. D. Conn. 
1008 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:961 
debtor in In re Windom219 sought to discharge non-support obligations owed 
to his ex-wife. Because he could discharge the debts only by proving that he 
was unable to pay, the court assessed the husband's ability to pay based on 
the household's total income.220 Although the debtor's current wife did not 
work outside of the home, the court noted that she had "the ability to work 
and can begin working at any time. "221 Because such earnings would add to 
the debtor's disposable income, the court refused to find that the debtor was 
unable to pay his divorce obligations.222 
In In re Stewart,223 a debtor likewise sought to discharge non-support di-
vorce obligations. The debtor argued that, because his first wife had remar-
ried and was now financially well-off, he should no longer have to pay the 
debt. 224 Although the debtor had incurred significant additional debts, the 
court concluded that because he and his new wife were both doctors, their 
combined earning potential should be "ten times to twenty times what the av-
erage American makes in a year, perhaps even more. "225 The court deter-
mined that the debtor could afford to pay his divorce obligation, stressing 
that even if the debtor could not pay the debt entirely from his own earnings, 
he could repay the debts with the help of his current wife "whose own con-
siderable earnings can support them while [the debtor] pays his just 
debts. "226 
1996); In re Cleveland, 198 B.R. 394, 398 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996); cf In re Adams, 200 
B.R. 630, 634 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) ("[C]ourts cannot possibly determine exactly how 
much of a debtor's own income is truly 'necessary' for his and his dependents' support 
without inquiring into ... how much his new spouse is contributing to the family's main-
tenance."); In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102, 106 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996) (observing that, 
when a debtor remarries before a court issues a determination in his section 523(a)(15) 
case, the court should include the new spouse's income in its calculation of disposable in-
come); In re Hill, 184 B.R. 750, 755 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (noting that the plaintiffs 
assertion that the debtor's wife should take a part-time job is "not totally without merit" 
and noting the wife's contribution in the form of received child support). 
219 207 B.R. 1017 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1997). 
220 See id. at 1021 (adopting a "totality of the circumstances" approach and rejecting a 
"snapshot" view of the debtor's financial situation). 
221 /d. at 1022. 
222 See id. 
223 201 B.R. 996 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1996). 
224 See id. at 1007 ("The point is not whether they (the debtor's ex-wife and children) 
need it, but whether he owes it to them."). 
225 /d. at 1006. 
226 /d. at 1007. Similarly, the court in In re Duncan, 201 B.R. 889 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
1996), dismissed a Chapter 7 case because the debtor, who earned approximately $60,000 
annually, sought a Chapter 7 discharge rather than attempting to repay his debts through a 
Chapter 13 plan. See id. at 892-93. The court held that allowing the case to proceed 
would constitute a substantial abuse of the Chapter 7 process and noted that most of the 
debtor's monthly expenditures were household expenses rather than personal expenses. 
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Courts that take into account the income of a new spouse or co-habitant 
conclude that it is impossible to reach an adequate evaluation of a debtor's 
ability to repay without considering all income sources actually or potentially 
available to the debtor. Indeed, one recent opinion essentially imputed in-
come to the debtor's non-filing new wife, observing that "the fact that [the 
debtor's new wife] chooses not to work cannot, by itself, defeat the [ex-
wife's] right to recover based solely on the debtor's inability to pay. "227 
However, courts that do consider a new spouse's income have not yet gone 
so far as to order a new spouse to pay directly on an obligation owed by a 
debtor to an ex-spouse. Nevertheless, a court that considers a current 
spouse's income implicitly assumes that the total household income of a mar-
ried debtor is relevant to whether that married person should be permitted to 
discharge a non-support divorce debt. 
v. Nondischargeability of Student Loans Due to Non-Debtor 
Income 
Finally, courts routinely consider a non-filing spouse's actual and potential 
income when deciding whether a debtor should be allowed to discharge a 
student loan. Although student loans generally are not dischargeable, 228 
courts will discharge an otherwise nondischargeable student loan if the 
debtor shows that repaying the loan will impose an undue hardship on the 
debtor or the debtor's dependents. 229 The court in In re Albert,230 for exam-
See id. at 899. For this reason, the court concluded that it should consider both spouses' 
incomes in determining whether the debtor could repay at least some of his debts in a 
Chapter 13 plan. See id. at 900. 
227 In re Windom, 207 B.R. 1017, 1022 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1997). 
228 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (including student loans in exceptions to discharge). 
229 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (describing the "undue hardship" exception). See 
generally In re Fox, 189 B.R. 115, 118 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (noting that the Code 
does not define "undue hardship"); In re Garrett, 180 B.R. 358, 363 (Bankr. D.N.H. 
1995) (indicating that the dischargeability of student loans is a case-by-case inquiry); Vir-
ginia State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Dillon, 189 B.R. 382, 385 (W.D. Va. 1995) 
(applying a threshold undue hardship inquiry which determines "if payment of the loans 
would cause [the debtor's] standard of living to fall below that minimally necessary") 
(citation omitted); In re Ipsen, 149 B.R. 583, 585 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (same); In re 
Velis, 123 B.R. 497, 512 (D.N.J. 1991), rev'd in part, aff'd in relevant part, 949 F.2d 78 
(3d Cir. 1991) (indicating that an undue hardship inquiry should take a non-debtor 
spouse's income into account); In re Belt, 106 B.R. 553, 562 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989); In 
re Coleman, 98 B.R. 443, 452 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1989) (indicating that a court must take 
all factors into account when determining undue hardship and can not rely on a "snapshot" 
of the debtor's situation); In re Albert, 25 B.R. 98, 101 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982) (same); 
In re Hartung, 24 B.R. 850, 852 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982) (discussing the circumstances 
in which a court might find undue hardship); In re Lezer, 21 B.R. 783, 789 (Bankr. 
N.D.N.Y. 1982) (applying both the "mechanical" and the "policy" tests for undue hard-
ship). 
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ple, concluded that, because the debtor and non-filing spouse probably com-
mingled funds and expenses, the court could consider the non-filing spouse's 
income when deciding whether repaying a student loan would cause the 
debtor undue hardship. 231 Similarly, the court in In re Koch232 required a 
debtor to repay four student loans, basing its conclusion in part on the fact 
that the non-filing spouse failed to seek either full-time or additional part-
time employment to contribute to the household's income. 233 In another 
case,234 the court maintained that it did not wish to "denigrate the importance 
of [a non-filing spouse's] position as a homemaker" but nevertheless con-
cluded that, because the wife was "young, healthy, and apparently capable of 
generating at least some income in order to relieve the family's current 
plight, "235 repaying the student loans would not impose an undue hardship on 
the couple. Likewise, the court in In re Wilson236 based its refusal to dis-
charge a loan in part on the debtor-wife's "deliberate decision to not return 
to work in order to care for her newborn at home. "237 The court recognized 
the "debtor's desire to play an active role in the development and rearing of 
her child, "238 but stressed that the debtor's decision to limit family income 
was voluntarily and that the wife's "employment status is subject to change 
at any time when she so chooses to alter her status. "239 Finally, the court in 
In re Zibura240 acknowledged that debtors may decide to have one spouse 
remain in the home full-time, but concluded that it would be "inappropriate 
for them to make that decision at the expense of' creditors. 241 The court ul-
timately based its refusal to discharge the loan on the fact that the home-
maker spouse was young and in good health. 242 
230 25 B.R. 98 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982). 
231 See id. at 101 (rejecting debtor's undue hardship claim). 
232 144 B.R. 959 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992). 
233 See id. at 962. 
234 In re Franklin, Ch. 7 Case No. 3-93-6489, Adv. No. 4-95-032, 1995 Bankr. Lexis 
1297 (Bankr. D. Minn. Sep. 8, 1995). 
235 /d. at * 17. 
236 177 B.R. 246 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994). 
237 /d. at 248. 
238 /d. at 249. 
239 /d. at 250. But see In re Ford, 22 B.R. 442, 442-43 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1982) 
(granting a loan hardship discharge for a debtor with four small children based on the 
court's conclusion that the debtor's wife would be unable to seek employment so long as 
she had children under the age of 2). 
240 128 B.R. 129 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991). 
241 /d. at 130. 
242 See id. at 134; cf In re Springer, 54 B.R. 910, 914-15 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985) 
(denying hardship discharge but declining to mandate that stay-at-home mother/debtor get 
a job). But see Ford, 22 B.R. at 446 (discharging loan because of court's view that 
wife/debtor "will not be able to seek employment until her 2 year old infant reaches school 
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vi. Public Policy Justification 
As a matter of public policy, a non-debtor spouse who has benefited from 
the debtor's discharge and has either non-exempt assets or disposable income 
should not be allowed to shift the burden of repaying marital debts away 
from herself and onto creditors or society. If there are legitimate public 
policy reasons to provide government subsidized incentives to married cou-
ples to which single individuals do not have access, then other federal laws 
should also support the view that marriage is a unique type of relationship. 
Requiring non-debtor spouses to provide financial support to their debtor 
spouses is consistent with the view of marriage as a "covenant" and with the 
belief that married couples have a moral obligation to support each other 
both emotionally and economically. Such a policy in the context of bank-
ruptcy would reinforce the societal goal of encouraging spouses, rather than 
creditors, to bear the primary responsibility of helping a partner in bank-
ruptcy. 243 The failure to adopt such a policy amounts, in effect, to a subsidy 
for the non-filing spouse, paid for by society and by creditors, and from 
which neither creditors nor society receives any tangible, objective benefit. 244 
age"). 
243 The trend toward making the doctrine of necessaries apply equally to husbands and 
wives is one example of how the law, in other contexts, treats marriage as a partnership 
premised on mutual economic support. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-37 (Michie 1998); 
Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 1 (Ind. 1993); St. Francis Reg'l Med. 
Ctr. v. Bowlas, 836 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Kan. 1992); Hulse v. Warren, 777 S.W.2d 319, 
322 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 
A.2d 1003, 1003 (N.J. 1980); Medical Bus. Assoc., Inc. v. Steiner, 183 A.D.2d 86, 86 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1992); North Carolina Baptist Hosp., Inc. v. Harris, 354 S.E.2d 471, 
474 (N.C. 1987); Richland Mem'l Hosp. v. Burton, 318 S.E.2d 12, 12 (S.C. 1984); 
Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 314 N.W.2d 326, 326 (Wis. 1982). Other states statutorily 
impose mutual obligations of support on both spouses. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE§ 4300 
(West·1998); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 13, § 502 (1993); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 510-8(h) 
(Michie 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1652 (West 1998); N.Y. JUD. LAW§ 
412 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.01 (Anderson 1998). 
A number of states have determined that the doctrine violates the Equal Protection clause 
and have therefore denied the doctrine's effect. See, e.g., North Ottawa Community 
Hosp. v. Kieft, 578 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Mich. 1998); Webb v. Hillsborough Hosp. Auth., 
521 So.2d 199, 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). See generally Daniel D. McClain, Devel-
opments in State Constitutional Law: 1994: VI Equal Protection, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 1110, 
1111 & n.ll (1995). 
244 Although our society pays lip service to the idea that society benefits when a child is 
raised by a stay-at-home parent, there appears to be a collective judgment in practice that 
this is not true in cases where the public is forced to subsidize stay-at-home mothers. 
Thus, our laws reflect the belief that society benefits more when a single mother on wel-
fare works outside the home than when she devotes her energies to full time mothering. 
See infra notes 248, 252-254 and accompanying text. Allowing married mothers to stay 
home and rear children rather than work outside the home to pay off debt would be incon-
sistent with this policy. 
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Requiring a stay-at-home spouse, usually the wife, to provide financial 
support to the wage earner spouse would also help to equalize the economic 
treatment of all women in bankruptcy. Only upper or middle class wives are 
likely to have the luxury of choosing to remain at home. In addition to 
making a class distinction, current doctrine also discriminates on the basis of 
race: Historically, black women have either never had or never exercised the 
option of staying home to be full-time homemakers. 245 Instead, they consis-
tently earned wages in the market along with their husbands. 246 Requiring 
all wives whose husbands file for relief in bankruptcy to work in the market 
would result in the equal treatment of all non-filing spouses in bankruptcy, 
regardless of economic class, race, or current wage-earner status.247 
The final, and perhaps most important, public policy justification for re-
quiring stay-at-home spouses to relinquish non-exempt property or earn 
wages in return for bankruptcy benefits is that bankruptcy benefits should be 
treated like all other federal entitlements. Admittedly, a drastic reorientation 
of the government's view of what type of woman should be obliged to work 
outside the home must take place248 before Congress will be willing to refuse 
245 See Siegel, supra note 50, at 1086-87; see also Beverly I. Moran & William Whit-
ford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 751, 795 (1996). 
246 See Perry, supra note 2, at 2489-90 ("Because Black men typically earn less than 
white men, for most Black families, having the mother in the workforce has always been a 
necessity."). See generally JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE,. LABOR OF SORROW 6-8 
(1985). 
247 Professor Twila Perry notes that one unintended "benefit" of no-fault divorce is the 
equalization of the economic status of women. See Perry, supra note 2, at 2513. She ob-
serves that since the advent of no-fault divorce, courts increasingly have refused to award 
alimony. See id. Upper and middle class women may have been harmed by no-fault laws 
because they did not anticipate either that the lifetime support they expected to receive 
from their husbands would end at divorce or that new laws would prevent them from being 
awarded long-term alimony. See id. (arguing that wealthy women could learn a lot about 
independence from poor women). 
248 See FINEMAN, supra note 26, at 115: 
Women who have become single mothers due to the death of their spouses are gener-
ally excused from the condemnation so frequently cast at their never-married sisters. 
These mothers are sympathetically considered worthy as widows even if they have 
not worked or do not work. Widows are typically entitled to generous Social Secu-
rity benefits, whereas, in contrast, mothers who are divorced or who never marry are 
left to the variability of the child support system or AFDC. 
/d.; see also WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 141-142 (observing that, despite increasing di-
vorce rates, the law provides federal benefits to divorced and widowed persons on an une-
qual basis); Perry, supra note 2, at 2500-01 (asserting that society sympathizes with col-
lege-educated married women who forego careers to rear children but holds women who 
have children and receive public assistance in contempt); Stephen D. Sugarman, Financial 
Support of Children and the End of Welfare as We Know It, 81 VA. L. REV. 2523, 2543 
(1995) (criticizing the current welfare system for allowing welfare mothers who are 
"physically capable of working to get something for nothing"). 
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federal bankruptcy benefits to husbands whose wives do not work outside the 
home. Historically, states have refused to order married women to work 
outside the home, to regulate intimate family affairs, or to enforce interspou-
sal support obligations in intact marriages. 249 In contrast, the federal gov-
ernment has been willing to interfere with the economic relationships be-
tween spouses. For example, a spouse applying for a federally guaranteed 
student loan is deemed to have access to the non-applicant spouse's in-
come.250 Similarly, if only one spouse applies for federal welfare benefits, 
the non-filing spouse's income is deemed available to the applicant and is 
taken into account when determining the applicant's eligibility and the 
amount of benefits granted. 251 
Congress recently enacted federal laws that require female welfare recipi-
ents to work outside the home in return for receiving government assis-
tance. 252 Just as Congress requires women to earn federal welfare benefits, 
it should require women who are beneficiaries of the federal bankruptcy 
249 See Shultz, supra note 147, at 234 (positing that the "unenforceability of support 
obligations" during a marriage is understood as a given in domestic relations law). Al-
though modern courts will enforce most premarital agreements, most still will not enforce 
interspousal contracts that obligate the husband to pay for acts traditionally performed by 
wives, including the provision of domestic household labor. See Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 
Cal. Rptr.2d 16, 20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (suggesting that a spouse is not entitled to com-
pensation for support that arises from marital relations); Finch v. Finch, 592 N.E.2d 
1260, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a wife cannot be compensated upon divorce 
for leaving her job to care for sick husband); Ritchie v. White, 35 S.E.2d 414, 416 (N.C. 
1945) (holding that a contract between husband and wife for services rendered by wife to 
her late husband was unenforceable because it related to domestic obligations incident to 
marriage); Oates v. Oates, 33 S.E.2d 457, 460 (W. Va. 1945). See generally Siegel, su-
pra note 27, at 2182. 
250 See 20 U.S.C. § l087nn(b)(1)(A). 
251 See 42 U.S.C. § l382c(d)(2) (deeming an informal marriage to be a formal one for 
the purposes of imputing income). One scholar observed that "[t]ederal laws recognize 
the unmarried couple only when those laws work to the couple's financial disadvantage." 
Chambers, supra note 18, at 473 n.lOl. 
252 Recent welfare reform legislation and welfare reform laws passed in the 1980s re-
flect the belief that welfare dependency is a societal problem that requires a dramatic re-
orientation of welfare policy. See e.g., MARY J. BANE & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE 
REALITIES: FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM 19-27 (1994) (discussing the efforts of different 
states to change their welfare systems). The core objectives of welfare reform were to 
require welfare recipients to work as a condition of receiving federal benefits, to stress to 
welfare recipients that benefits are not lifelong, and to instill the work ethic in both moth-
ers and their children. See H.R. REP. No.l04-651, at 5-6 (1996), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2186-87. Indeed, even welfare recipients with small children are 
expected either to leave the home and earn wages or to risk losing federal benefits. See, 
e.g., Perry, supra note 24, at 359 ("It would appear, at least from the recent obsession 
with forcing welfare mothers to work, that one value assumed to be passed on to children 
in the traditional family but not in a single mother family is the work ethic."). 
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system to earn the benefits that the bankruptcy system provides. 253 If an 
unmarried mother must work in return for public assistance benefits, a stay-
at-home spouse who benefits from her spouse's discharge of marital debts 
should likewise be required to work in return for those benefits. 254 In short, 
given the federal government's apparent conclusion that federal benefits must 
be earned, there is no rational justification for not requiring that a wife either 
relinquish non-exempt assets or work for wages if she benefits from her hus-
band's bankruptcy discharge. 
b. Enjoining Suits Against Non-filer 
Courts should enjoin all creditor suits against an economically independent 
non-filing spouse255 in return for the financial assistance the spouse would be 
required to provide to the debtor. This would encourage the spouse to help 
the debtor repay debts voluntarily and discourage the debtor from filing a 
bankruptcy petition. The court in In re Archambault256 issued such an in-
junction. After the debtor and his business filed petitions for relief under 
Chapter 7, a creditor sought to collect a business debt from the non-debtor 
spouse. The debtor and his wife sought injunctive relief and argued that al-
though the wife had a general knowledge of the husband's business, she had 
virtually no legal association with it. 257 While acknowledging this to be an 
exceptional case, the court held that an injunction was appropriate because 
allowing the creditor to sue the wife would exert pressure on the debtor and 
constitute "an end-run around the automatic stay. "258 
Unless the non-filing spouse has a financial relationship with the debtor, 
allowing a separate creditor to sue the non-filer would only exert pressure on 
the debtor spouse and would serve no valid purpose. 259 Just as courts have 
253 See generally, FINEMAN, supra note 26, at 75-76 (observing that governmental re-
sponse to, and treatment of, mothers varies depending on whether the mother is married, 
divorced, or never married). 
254 See Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2197 
(1995) (arguing that the punitive nature of welfare reform is used to punish women who 
give birth outside of a heterosexual marriage). 
255 When a partnership files for bankruptcy protection, but some of the partners do not, 
individual partners often will claim that creditors' actions against them personally should 
be enjoined by the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362. Most courts have concluded that 
general partners are not protected by the automatic stay and will allow creditors to pursue 
the general partners' assets without regard to the automatic stay. See, e.g. , Austin v. 
UNARCO Indus., Inc., 705 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1983) (stating that an automatic stay nor-
mally does not foreclose suits against general partners of bankrupt partnership). 
256 174 B.R. 923 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994). 
257 See id. at 931. 
258 /d. at 935. 
259 The Code generally prevents creditors from engaging in acts designed to force a 
debtor to repay debts either that the debtor is repaying through a Chapter 13 plan or that 
are discharged or dischargeable in the Chapter 7 or 13 case. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(a)-(b), 
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been willing to enjoin suits against non-debtor general partners of debtor 
partnerships,260 Congress should instruct courts to enjoin suits against non-
filing spouses even if the non-filer has income that could be used to pay the 
filer's debts. Such an injunction should issue whenever the non-debtor 
spouse receives no direct or indirect bankruptcy benefits through the marital 
partnership. 
II. ADOPTING A MARITAL FRAMEWORK FOR BANKRUPTCY 
Although all of the marriage models pose difficulties in application and 
potentially create conflicts with certain public policies, Congress continues to 
grant benefits based on marital status261 and must therefore impose burdens 
to prevent married debtors from engaging in strategic pre-filing behavior. I 
propose that Congress treat marriage as a partnership and revise the Code to 
provide that a married debtor's case be presumptively dismissed262 unless 
either the debtor proves that the debts to be discharged are not marital 
debts263 or the non-filing spouse agrees to help the filing spouse repay debts 
1201(a), 1301(a) (outlining requirements for enforceability of reaffirmation agreements 
obligating debtors to repay otherwise dischargeable debts; preventing creditors from col-
lecting from debtors; and enjoining post-petition attempts to collect discharged debts). 
260 See, e.g., In re Myerson & Kuhn, 121 B.R. 145, 149 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(describing how the non-debtor partners of the debtor law firm partnership sought a tem-
porary restraining order to enjoin creditors from maintaining litigation against them). The 
court granted the injunction, concluding that staying collection attempts against the part-
ners was necessary to (1) ensure an orderly process of equitable distribution to all credi-
tors; (2) encourage the non-debtor partners to assist in the law firm's reorganization ef-
forts; (3) discourage the individual partners from filing for personal bankruptcies; and (4) 
prevent inter-partner disputes and partnership claims for contributions that would further 
complicate the partnership's reorganization process. See id. at 155; see also In re 
Litchfield Co. of S.C. Ltd. Partnership, 135 B.R. 797, 804-05 (Bankr. W .D.N.C. 1992) 
(staying an action filed by a creditor of a partnership against a non-debtor partner because 
(1) a partnership's power to compel individual partners to contribute to the partnership is 
property of the bankruptcy estate; (2) allowing the suit to continue would not have been 
consistent with the policy of equitable distribution to similarly situated creditors; and (3) 
allowing the suit to continue would have led to wasteful competition among the individual 
creditors attempting to collect independently). 
261 Whether, in fact, Congress should grant status-based benefits is a separate issue. In 
another article, I address this question and conclude that Congress should not, at least in 
the bankruptcy context. See Dickerson, supra note 16. 
262 Although some courts have concluded that they have jurisdiction to order the sub-
stantive consolidation of the debtor and non-debtor's assets, see supra notes 72-73, 76-78 
and accompanying text, bankruptcy courts probably lack jurisdiction to compel a non-
debtor to commit income to a debtor. See In re Fischel, 103 B.R. 44, 49 (Bankr. 
N.D.N.Y. 1989). 
263 Allowing spouses to prove they have a "his, hers, and ours" financial arrangement 
in their marriage would be consistent with the shift in philosophy in partnership law. Al-
though the old UPA is based on the "aggregate" theory that the partnership is simply an 
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by relinquishing non-exempt assets or applying future income toward the 
debts. Before explaining why I propose that Congress treat marriages as 
partnerships, I will first explain why I reject the models of marriage as a 
merger and as an arm's length contract. 
A. Limitations of Viewing Marriage as a Merger 
Congress should not treat marriages as mergers because the merger model 
is based on the outdated view that wives are emotional providers and hus-
bands are economic providers who have the right to exercise sole control 
over all marital assets. The marriage as a merger model sharply conflicts 
with modem social policies and commercial practices and promotes an 
anachronistic view of marriage because it (1) forces an economically inde-
pendent spouse to file a bankruptcy petition and (2) automatically seizes the 
non-filing spouse's assets to pay the filer's debts. 
1. Mandatory Joint Filings 
Mandatory joint filing is consistent with the merger model paradigm of 
husbands earning all income and wives being supported by that income. 
However, for a number of reasons, Congress should not condition one 
spouse's right to bankruptcy relief on the other spouse's willingness to file a 
bankruptcy petition. First, although creditors can file involuntary Chapter 7 
petitions and attempt to seize a debtor's existing assets,264 the Code does not 
permit creditors to file involuntary Chapter 13 petitions because that would 
effectively force a debtor to work for others to repay debts. 265 Second, a 
wife in a "traditional" merger marriage would, by definition, not earn in-
come outside the home, a generalization that is unrealistic given the number 
of modem wives who work outside the home for wages, 266 have separate 
aggregate of the partners, the new UPA adopts an "entity" theory that assumes that the 
partnership enterprise exists independent of the partners. Compare UNIF. PARTNERSHIP 
ACT § 6 (1914), 6 U.L.A. at 256 with REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 601(1), 602 
(1994), 6 U.L.A. at 72-74, 77-78. Allowing non-debtor spouses to avoid the burden of 
the filing spouse's debts when the spouses can prove that the money from those debts 
benefited only the filing spouse seems consistent with modern partnership law. 
264 See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a). 
265 See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 165 (1991). 
266 See Janelle T. Calhoun, Comment, Interstate Child Support Enforcement System: 
Juggernaut of Bureaucracy, 46 MERCER L. REV. 921, 950 (1995) ("Historically, the father 
was the breadwinner and the mother stayed home with the children. In today's economy, 
however, both parents frequently work to support the family."); Elizabeth A. Heaney, 
Comment, Pennsylvania's Doctrine of Necessities: An Anachronism Demanding Abolish-
ment, 101 DICK. L. REV. 233, 234 n.7 (1996) ("[M]arried women with preschool children 
represent the fastest growing category of workers in the U.S. economy. In 1989 only 22% 
of U.S. husband-wife families had the husband/father as the sole breadwinner in keeping 
with the traditional image of the nuclear family, while 49 percent had both partners work-
ing."); Joan O'Brien, Straw Strength; Planned Community Builds The Old Way Naturally; 
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credit cards267 and checking accounts,268 and own real property in their own 
names.269 Finally, the Married Women's Property Acts gave wives the right 
to retain ownership of their pre-marital property and Congress should not re-
vert270 to the view that wives are dependent economic non-entities whose as-
sets can be seized because of their spouses' improvident financial behavior. 
2. Substantive Consolidation of Spouses' Assets 
Viewing marriage as a merger allows courts to consolidate spouses' assets, 
potentially disrupting routine commercial transactions and unfairly harming 
some creditors. For example, if creditors extended credit to non-debtor 
Spouse Win reliance on that spouse's reported debts and assets, consolidat-
ing Spouse W' s assets with Spouse H' s assets could be unfair to creditors of 
Spouse W. Allowing creditors of debtor Spouse H to seek payment from 
Spouse W's assets effectively destroys the expectations of Spouse W's credi-
tors, who extended credit believing that they would have sole access to 
Spouse W's assets. 
Forcing one spouse to use assets to support a filing spouse is also prob-
lematic on social policy grounds. If workers who are employed outside of 
the home know that they may have to repay separate debts incurred by their 
spouses or future spouses, some may either (1) choose not to marry; (2) 
marry, but refuse to work outside the home for wages; or (3) marry, but file 
for divorce as soon as their spouses encounter financial difficulties. Since 
the policy of both state and federal government is to encourage people to 
work, 271 marry, and support each other while married, Congress should not 
pass legislation that encourages idleness or divorce and discourages mar-
riage.272 
Planned Community Draws Straws, SALT LAKE TRIB., May 2, 1997, at E1 ("[L]ess than a 
fourth of Americans fit the profile of bread-winning father, homemaking mother and chil-
dren."). 
267 See Llyce R. Glink, These Days, Single Home Buyers Are Hardly Alone, CHIC. SuN-
TIMES, Mar. 17, 1996, at 13 ("Women today commonly establish their own credit by 
having telephone numbers or credit cards in their own name, even when married."). 
268 See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 178 (discussing a 1980 Poll indicating an increase 
in the number of married women with separate bank accounts); Michele Morris, Yours, 
Mine and Ours: (Money in Marriage), LADIES HOME J., Oct. 1, 1996, at 52 (discussing the 
financial arrangements available to married couples). 
269 See generally Vivian Marino, Popping the Question to Newlyweds: When are You 
Going to Separate Your Finances?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July 13, 1997. 
27° For a discussion of the public's rejection of the traditional concept of breadwinner-
husband and homemaker-spouse, see WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 174. 
271 See BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 252, at 19-27 (describing the reorientation of 
welfare policy during the 1980s). 
272 See In re Cheeseman, 656 F.2d 60, 63 (4th Cir. 1981) (construing the definition of 
"householder" broadly to induce couple to remain married during financial crises). Critics 
of earlier welfare legislation argued that such laws encouraged men to abandon their wives 
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3. Allowing Separate Creditors Access to Entirety Property 
Finally, because modern spouses often are equal financial partners, Con-
gress should not give separate creditors of a fiscally irresponsible spouse the 
automatic right to satisfy their debts from jointly owned entirety property. 
Because some state laws continue to view entirety property as being owned 
wholly by both spouses, 273 a separate creditor that can satisfy its debt from 
entirety property in a bankruptcy proceeding arguably has significantly 
greater rights in bankruptcy than it would have under state law, thus encour-
aging forum shopping by creditors. 274 Because creditors can protect them-
selves under state law and in bankruptcy by requiring both spouses to co-sign 
a debt, it is against both bankruptcy policy and public policy to protect 
creditors from a result they could have prevented themselves. 275 
B. Limitations of Viewing Marriage as a Contract 
If Congress chooses to recognize marital status in bankruptcy, it should 
not allow married couples to decide whether to support each other economi-
cally or emotionally as though they were arm's length contracting parties. 
Allowing couples to treat marriage as an arm's length contract harms credi-
tors by encouraging married debtors to engage in strategic pre-filing behav-
ior. Although a basic tenet of marriage is that spouses have an obligation to 
support each other to some degree, 276 a wife in a contract marriage would 
have no more duty to support her husband than would any other creditor or 
unrelated party in interest. This would be true even if her husband shifted all 
and children because the laws denied welfare benefits to mothers if a male wage earner 
lived in the home. See Perry, supra note 24, at 349. Modern welfare laws purportedly 
eliminate the incentive for men to leave their families. See Paul Offner, Welfare Dads, 
NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 13, 1995. 
273 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (discussing the treatment of entirety 
property by different states). 
274 See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's mandate 
to develop procedures in bankruptcy designed to deter forum shopping). 
275 For example, see In re Birch, 72 B.R. 103, 107 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1987), where the 
court refused to consolidate assets because the creditor had "an easily available remedy 
and protection, i.e., asking the wife to co-sign or guarantee the debt." /d. For a general 
discussion of efficiently allocating the risk of loss, see RICHARD POSNER, EcONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.10 (2d ed. 1977); Steven L. Harris, The Interaction of Articles 7 
and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Study in Conveyancing, Priorities, and Code 
Interpretation, 39 VAND. L. REV. 179, 211 (1986) ("One common approach to problems 
of risk allocation is to impose the risk of loss on the party who can prevent or insure 
against the loss at less cost."). 
276 See supra note 163 and accompanying text (discussing the common view of marriage 
taken by most states). See generally Lynn A. Baker, Promulgating the Marriage Con-
tract, 23 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 217, 225 n.31 (1990) ("By 1975, a fundamental conse-
quence of marriage was that each spouse acquired a duty to support each other ... finan-
cially during marriage in proportion to their individual abilities."). 
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assets to her or the couple titled assets as entirety property while leaving 
debts in the husband's name. 277 In addition to being abusive and possibly a 
fraudulent transfer, 278 such strategic pre-filing behavior is also elitist. The 
only debtors likely to have either the financial sophistication to arrange such 
a deal or the funds required to hire a lawyer are well-educated middle to up-
per class filers. 279 Even a poor debtor who understands how to manipulate 
the system probably could not benefit from such behavior because he is un-
likely to have enough assets to make it worthwhile to shift them to his 
wife. 280 
C. Limitations of Viewing Marriage as a Partnership 
Although I propose that Congress treat marriage as a partnership, I recog-
277 See In re Ve\is, 123 B.R. 497, 512 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991), rev'd in part, aff'd in 
relevant part, 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that failing to consider the non-debtor 
spouse's income and assets "creates an opportunity for abuse by an astute potential debtor 
in the form of a transfer of assets and streams of income into the name of the non-debtor 
spouse prior to and in contemplation of filing the petition"). 
278 See Margaret Dee McGarity, Avoidable Transfers Between Spouses and Former 
Spouses, 31 FAM. L.Q. 393, 402-06 (1997) (discussing property transfers between spouses 
and former spouses and common reasons for them). 
279 Many scholars argue that the cost of legal advice has effectively removed the judicial 
system from the reach of the poor. See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 194-95 (arguing that 
the poor use the "common law divorce" of physical separation because they cannot afford 
to pay for legal advice); Hedieh Nasheri & David L. Rudolph, Equal Protection Under the 
Law: Improving Access to Civil Justice, 20 AM. J. TRIAL Aovoc. 305, 332 n.1 (1996-97) 
("[T]he United States civil justice system has become increasingly inefficient, overbur-
dened, and costly. As a result, the system has been unable to process cases efficiently and 
render justice. This crisis in the civil justice system takes its biggest toll on the nation's 
poor."); Charles Silver, Unloading the Lodestar: Toward a New Fee Award Procedure, 10 
TEX. L. REv. 865, 875 (1992) (noting that people "with so little wealth might use the 
money to buy food, clothing, or shelter instead of legal aid"). See generally John 
Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REV. 579, 589 (1984) (discussing 
the inherent class-based inequality of the United States legal system); Jonathan R. Macey, 
Mandatory Pro Bono: Comfort for the Poor or Welfare for the Rich?, 77 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1115, 1116-17 ( 1992) (noting that legal fees are not an important priority to the poor 
who spend their limited resources on material necessities). 
280 See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 481 (1997) (indicating a wide disparity in nonfinancial assets held by families with 
incomes of less than $10,000 versus those with incomes exceeding $50,000). Given the 
average household incomes of Asians, Whites, Blacks and Hispanics, permitting these pre-
filing asset shifts may disproportionately benefit White and Asian debtors. See id. at 465. 
The 1995 median income for Asian households was $40,614 and $35,766 for White 
households, but only $33,393 for Black households and $22,860 for Hispanic households. 
See id. Similarly, while 24% of Black households in 1995 had less than $10,000 in 
household income, only 10.6% of White households had less than $10,000 in household 
income. See id. 
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nize that this model is also flawed. First, unlike standard partnerships, most 
married couples do not have a written partnership agreement that describes 
how marital profits and losses are to be allocated. Similarly, without a part-
nership agreement, courts would be forced to rely on the debtor's ex post 
characterization of the debts sought to be discharged and of the parties' intent 
regarding the filing partner's obligations. Without a written agreement, it 
would be difficult for a court to determine whether the partners agreed at the 
inception of the partnership that the debts the filing partner claims are 
"individual" were in fact supposed to be partnership debts. For example, if 
the debtor pays for items for the household, such as food and household 
goods, it would be virtually impossible to determine whether those debts 
should be characterized as separate or joint without an itemized account of 
the charges and a written partnership agreement that provides for the pay-
ment of separately incurred debts that benefit the partnership. 
One way to eliminate this uncertainty is to amend the Code to presume 
that all debts are marital. Such a presumption is consistent with the assump-
tion made both by Congress281 and many courts282 that spouses who live to-
gether pool income and have joint debts. A married debtor could rebut this 
presumption with a premarital agreement that explains the spouses' economic 
obligations to each other and documentary evidence such as receipts, can-
celed checks, or credit card statements that prove that the spouses incurred 
and paid debts consistent with the terms of the agreement. Absent such 
written proof, debts would be presumed to be marital debts that benefited the 
non-filing spouse. 
Second, requiring a non-debtor spouse to use income to help a filing 
spouse repay debts is inconsistent with the Code's prohibition of involuntary 
Chapter 13 filings. Some might also suggest that conditioning federal bank-
ruptcy benefits on the recipient's willingness to work violates the Thirteenth 
Amendment's prohibition against involuntary ~rvitude. This argument, 
though somewhat compelling, should be rejected. The non-debtor spouse is 
not being forced to work to repay debts. 283 Rather, the non-debtor spouse is 
281 See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (discussing section 302 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code). 
282 See, e.g., In re Carter, 205 B.R. 733, 736 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) ("Consideration 
of the nondebtor spouse's income is seen as necessary because a portion of that spouse's 
income is likely to be applied to the basic needs of the debtor, potentially increasing the 
share of the debtor's own income that is not reasonably necessary for support."); In reAl-
bert, 25 B.R. 98, 101 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982) ("Although the debtor testified to the 
maintenance of separate expenses, it is not unreasonable to believe that the Debtor's pres-
ent spouse would attempt to assist in any expenses of the Debtor."). 
283 See Kenneth N. Klee, Restructuring Irulividual Debts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431, 
447-48 n.28 (1997) (rejecting the argument that a bankruptcy system requiring debtors to 
work to repay creditors would be unconstitutional and would constitute peonage). But see 
Karen Gross, The Debtor as a Modern Day Peon: A Problem of Unconstitutional Coruli-
tions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165, 169 (1990) (introducing the author's argument that a 
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being forced to work as a condition of receiving federal benefits, just as wel-
fare mothers are required to work as a condition of receiving federal bene-
fits. A non-debtor spouse who chooses not to work can do so as long as she 
is willing to forego those benefits. Moreover, "[t]here is no constitutional 
right to obtain a discharge of one's debts in bankruptcy. "284 Congress can 
always condition the benefits it provides on the recipient's willingness to ac-
cept the burdens associated with those benefits. 
Third, requiring a spouse in an intact marriage to leave the home to earn 
wages potentially serves to discourage marriage, a result which is arguably 
inconsistent with social policy. Legislatures consistently decline to condition 
a currently or previously married mother's government benefits on her 
agreement to work outside the home in return. 285 Thus, at least on some 
level, politicians seem to have concluded that married women provide 
greater value to society when they stay at home than unmarried women, es-
pecially unmarried single welfare mothers. Similarly, some might argue that 
forcing homemakers to get jobs devalues the contributions mothers make to 
society when they care for children286 and that this perpetuates the myth that 
housework is not valuable and does not contribute to the marital estate. 287 
Although these arguments are appealing on their face, they also should be 
rejected. Bankruptcy laws are not supposed to encourage behavior that 
causes a debtor to be unable to repay bills unless it protects the debtor's fresh 
start. Likewise, bankruptcy laws are not meant to place greater value on the 
non-economic contributions made by one type of woman than they place on 
debtor forced to work for bankruptcy benefits is sufficiently similar to a peon to indicate 
that the bankruptcy laws violate the 13th Amendment). 
284 United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973). 
285 See supra note 192 (discussing myriad government benefits and the way in which 
mothers are treated within the frameworks of those benefits). 
286 For example, Professor Martha Fineman challenges another author's analysis of how 
poor children develop negative attitudes towards work because the other author's argument 
ignores the possibility that mothering is "work." See FINEMAN, supra note 26, at 108. If 
mothering is considered "work," then the child of a single mother who pursues that type 
of work does not necessarily have a negative attitude toward work in the market. Rather, 
she argues that it could mean that the child prefers the work of mothering. See generally 
PERRY, supra note 24, at 360 (observing that domestic work in the home is valued less 
than market work because, in a patriarchal system, work is valued in "accordance with 
what is valued under patriarchy"). 
287 See supra notes 173-174, 213 and accompanying text. See generally Martha Cha-
mallas, Women and Part-Time Work: The Case for Pay Equity and Equal Access, 64 N.C. 
L. REV. 709, 730 (discussing the low value society places on housework and child care); 
Nancy R. Hauserman, Homemakers and Divorce: Problems of the Invisible Occupation, 
17 FAM. L.Q. 41, 43-44 (1983) (asserting that homemaker work is undervalued because of 
the difficulty in determining its economic value); Helen Y. Nelson, The Unpriced Services 
of the Unpaid Homemaker, 52 AM. VOCATIONAL J. 36, 36-38 (Oct. 1977) (noting that the 
dollar value of household work is ignored in calculating the GNP). 
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those of another. Because a primary goal of bankruptcy laws is to treat 
creditors equitably, there is no theoretical justification for a system that re-
quires an unmarried debtor to relinquish non-exempt assets in Chapter 7 or 
to maintain a wage-paying job in Chapter 13 but does not force a wife who 
benefits from her husband's bankruptcy case to relinquish similar assets or 
get a job. Moreover, notwithstanding any societal view as to the benefits of 
marriage and homemaking, bankruptcy courts fairly consistently conclude 
that homemaking and child-rearing, though subjectively valuable, simply do 
not generate "income" as that term is currently defined by our society. 288 
Finally, the recent debate over welfare reform suggests that both Congress 
and the states have determined that staying at home to rear children should 
be a luxury available only to those mothers who do not need government 
benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the competing and differing visions of marital roles and gender 
status, 289 it is not surprising that bankruptcy laws fail to advance a coherent 
or consistent standard that governs a non-debtor spouse's economic obliga-
tions to a debtor. The choice to marry is a personal right, 290 and bankruptcy 
laws are designed to regulate only a debtor's financial choices. Bankruptcy 
laws, therefore, should not be used to promote or reject non-economic per-
sonal choices. 291 However, because Congress currently gives debtors certain 
benefits based simply on marital status, it must decide what marriage means 
and to what extent married couples must love, honor, and pay each other's 
debts. 
288 See In re Moix-McNutt, 215 B.R. 405, 409 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1997) (cautioning that 
"while the position of housewife has great value, it rarely generates income"). 
289 See Marsha Garrison, How do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analy-
sis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 422 (1996) (noting that con-
troversy over divorce law obligations and entitlements is part of larger national debate on 
the issues of family, gender, and individual responsibility). 
290 This "right" is, of course, made available only to people who choose to marry 
someone of the opposite sex. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 3. 
291 See generally Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Pos-
sibility of a Shared Moral Life, 75 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1842, 1850 (1987) (arguing that the 
social approval of marriage and marriage-like relationships affects the legal regulation of 
marriage). 
